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 i 
Summary 
This thesis deals with the mapping of scholarship concerned with the 
development of Frontex. I argue that the scholarship is dispersed and entails 
several perspectives with different legal implications which contributes to a 
policy field and agency problematic to develop. By looking at lex ferenda 
proposals in the academic review of Frontex, I seek to highlight the complex 
settings and clarify the role of Frontex in the integration process within EU.   
Three perspectives are used as an analytical tool representing three diverse 
systems or sub-contexts within the integration debate surrounding Frontex. 
The integration perspective, the democratic perspective and the human 
rights perspective demonstrate the complexity in the policy field that 
surrounds Frontex and affects the perceived and pursued role of Frontex. To 
reveal the complexity contributes with a greater understanding of the policy 
field and of Frontex. The perspectives also highlight the struggle of power 
and control over the border and migration policies and in particular over 
Frontex; a tug of war between an intergovernmental approach and a 
supranational approach. A tug of war, which explains why the agency is so 
difficult to develop and to reform as well as why the Frontex Regulation 
entails significant shortcomings. 
The human rights and democratic perspectives call for an increased legal 
and democratic accountability which presuppose the involvement and 
reinforced role of the Parliament and the European Court of Justice and 
hence a more supranational control and power over Frontex. The integration 
perspective meets the reluctance of the Member States to transfer 
competences to the Union in its pursue of an efficient and uniform border 
management. 
The result is an agency, not as integrated as a Union agency may imply but 
rather a continuation of the intergovernmental predecessors and a deadlock 
for comprehensive legislative measures. The conclusion is that the struggle 
between the member States and the EU institutions seems to permeate each 
lex ferenda proposal, hampers the emergence of a comprehensive and 
balanced legal framework for the integrated border management and 
delivers legislative measures with rather severe shortcomings regarding 
Frontex. This logjam will last until the EU institutions and the Member 
States have settled the question of power and control over Frontex or rather 
until the Member States allow the Union to exercise its competence and 
contribute with supranational solutions for Frontex within the field of shared 
competences regarding management of the external borders.  
This would be in line with the subsidiarity principle since it has proven 
impossible to create a balanced, professional, efficient, legally and 
democratically accountable agency for management of operational 
cooperation in a more intergovernmental setting. It is needed a 
comprehensive supranational approach to achieve a truly integrated 
management of the external border of the EU.  
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Sammanfattning 
Den här uppsatsen söker att kartlägga doktrin som behandlar utvecklingen 
av Frontex. Jag hävdar att litteraturen är brokig och innehåller flera 
perspektiv med olika juridiska implikationer som bidrar till ett policyområde 
och en gränsbevakningsbyrå som är problematisk att utveckla. Genom att 
studera lex ferenda förslag i den akademiska granskningen av Frontex, söker 
jag belysa den komplexa situationen samt klargöra Frontex roll i 
integrationsprocessen inom EU.  
Metoden innebär att tre perspektiv används som analytiskt verktyg och 
representerar tre olika system eller under-kontexter inom 
integrationsdebatten kring Frontex. Integrationsperspektivet, demokrati-
perspektivet och rättighetsperspektivet visar komplexiteten i det policy 
område som omger Frontex, påverkar hur dess roll uppfattas och vilken 
framtida roll som eftersträvas. Att synliggöra den komplexa omgivningen 
bidrar till en ökad förståelse för policy området och för Frontex. 
Perspektiven belyser även kampen om makt och kontroll över migrations- 
och gränspolicys och framförallt över Frontex, en dragkamp mellan ett 
mellanstatlig och ett överstatligt förhållningssätt. En dragkamp som 
förklarar varför gränsbevakningsbyrån är så svår att utveckla och reformera 
samt varför Frontex förordningen innehåller fundamentala brister.  
Demokratiperspektivet och rättighetsperspektivet efterlyser ett stärkt legalt 
och demokratisk ansvar vilket förutsätter större delaktighet samt nya stärkta 
mandat för Europaparlamentet och EU-domstolen och därmed mer 
överstatlig kontroll och makt över Frontex. För att kunna uppnå en effektiv 
och uniform gränsbevakning utmanar integrationsperspektivet 
medlemsstaternas motvilja att överföra nationella befogenheter till EU-nivå.  
Resultatet är en byrå som inte är så integrerad som en EU-byrå antyder, utan 
snarare en fortsättning på det mellanstatliga samarbete som Frontex 
föregångare skapade, och ett dödläge för omfattande legislativa åtgärder. 
Slutsatsen är att maktkampen mellan medlemsstaterna och EUs institutioner 
infiltrerar varje lex ferenda förslag och hindrar framväxten av en balanserad 
och heltäckande lag för en integrerad förvaltning av EUs yttre gränser och 
bidrar till legislativa åtgärder med förhållandevis stora brister gällande 
Frontex. Dödläget kommer att bestå tills EUs institutioner och 
medlemsstaterna har avgjort frågan om makt och kontroll över Frontex, eller 
snarare tills medlemsstaterna fullständigt tillåter EU att utöva sin kompetens 
och bidra med överstatliga lösningar för Frontex i ett område med delad 
befogenhet, nämligen förvaltningen av de yttre gränserna.  
Detta är i enlighet med subsidaritetsprincipen, eftersom det visat sig 
omöjligt att skapa en balanserad, professionell och effektiv 
gränsbevakningsbyrå med rättsligt och demokratiskt ansvar under 
mellanstatliga förhållanden. Det behövs således ett helhetsgrepp på 
överstatlig nivå för att uppnå en verkligt integrerad förvaltning av EUs yttre 
gränser.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 The topic 
This thesis is concerned with analysing the European border and migration 
policies and in particular the European Border Agency (Frontex). The thesis 
aims to map the scholarship concerning Frontex’s role to better understand 
the agency as well as the way forward both regarding law and 
policymaking. I argue that the scholarship regarding the development of 
Frontex’s role is dispersed and demonstrates different perspectives, which 
make Frontex’s development problematic and difficult. As expressed by 
Baldaccini: 
While Member States continue to hold differing views on how far this 
EU agency should be strengthened and what its ultimate role should 
be, the continuous development of this agency seems to have been 
taken a life on its own.1 
If we want to understand European migration and border policies we have to 
recognize the different perspectives, the separate systems they create and 
their respective impact. The recognition of this complexity contributes with 
a greater understanding of how to develop policies and regulations 
regarding European borders, migration and particularly Frontex.   
The field of European immigration policies has, despite its highly sensitive 
character and the Member States’ reluctance to transfer sovereignty within 
the field to the EU, been one of the primary political elements in the 
European integration process with a high level of policy convergence. This 
was not generally expected with backdrop of the fact that the right to accept 
or refuse entry into State territory always has been the exclusive competence 
of the national State and perhaps the most striking expression of State 
sovereignty.2 This ‘Europeanization’ also applies to border policies, a 
process that has evolved dynamically in recent years, especially with the 
Schengen acquis. This process has conveyed fundamental changes in the 
perception of the relationship between borders and sovereignty.3 As one of 
many steps towards a common high standard control of the external borders 
and a common approach to immigration, Frontex was established in 2004 to 
facilitate and coordinate cooperation between Member States border control 
                                                
1 A Baldaccini ’Extraterritorial Immigration Control in the EU: The Role of Frontex in 
Operations at Sea’ in B Ryan and V Mitsilegas (eds), Extraterritorial Immigration Control 
(Ashgate, Leiden 2010) 254 [Baldaccini (2010)]. 
2 S Carrera, ’The impact of the Treaty of Lisbon over EU Policies on Migration, Asylum 
and Borders: The Struggles over the Ownership of the Stockholm Programme’ in E Guild, 
P Minderhoud (eds), The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law (Martinius 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2012) 229 [Carrera (2012)]. 
3 S Carrera, ’Towards a Common European Border Service?’ Centre of European Policy 
Studies (CEPS) Working Document No 331/June 2010, available at http://www.ceps.eu 
accessed 2 May 2013, 8 [Carrera (2010)]. 
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activities in pursue of uniform implementation of common policies and 
regulations.4 
While human rights advocates has denounced Frontex’s lack of commitment 
to comply with international human rights obligations, ie the prohibition of 
refoulement, EU institutions has declared the importance of Frontex in the 
combat of illegal immigration5 and have enhanced its role gradually.6 
Frontex has been the object of legal, political and interdisciplinary 
scholarship with different theories, methods and aims. In that regard, 
another study on the subject may not seem to add any value to the field of 
research. However, despite the coverage of the subject I argue that there still 
exists certain confusion due to a struggle over competences between 
member States and Union institutions.  
This thesis focuses on the scholarship concerning how Frontex’s role ought 
to be and should develop. This also demonstrates how the agency and the 
surrounding European policies are perceived today at the same time as it 
provides us with a clear lex ferenda perspective.  
The academic review of how Frontex should develop is a complex setting of 
various systems composed of opinions, perceptions, arguments, rationales 
and proposals. The proposed reforms are scattered and would imply effect 
on different legal regimes. This illustrates confusion concerning the future 
role of Frontex and confusion on how to perceive the current situation. 
Difficulties in the development of regulations and policies regarding 
Frontex are a natural corollary to this confusion.  
In this thesis I argue that these various approaches can be visualized and 
highlighted by using three perspectives to categorize them: the democratic 
perspective, the integration perspective and the human rights perspective. 
The perspectives highlight the complexity of the integration of migration 
and border policies and demonstrate the different legal implications of lex 
ferenda proposals due to the various rationales of the proposals. I argue 
that the perspectives contribute to an integration analysis in general and an 
increased understanding of the complexity of the policy field, the Area of 
                                                
4 Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union [2004] OJ L 349/1 [Frontex Regulation]. 
5 Regarding the notion of illegal immigrant/immigration this will only be used when 
referring to a source where it is used. I will otherwise use the term irregular immigration or 
undocumented immigrants while these terms more adequately describe the phenomena 
without negative associations to criminality and suspicion, see E Guild, ‘Who is an 
Irregular Immigrant’, in B. Bogusz et al (eds), Irregular Migration and Human Rights: 
Theoretical, European and International Perspectives (Martinus Nihjoff, Leiden 2004) 3-
28. 
6 See NGO’s submitted observations to the European Ombudsman’s own-initiative inquiry 
concerning implementation by Frontex of its fundamental rights obligations, available at 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/12022/html.bookmark 
accessed 17 February 2013. See also European Council, The Stockholm Programme – An 
Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the Citizens [2010] OJ C 115/1, 26 [The 
Stockholm Programme]. 
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Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), in particular.7 In this context the 
perspectives add an increased understanding of the current role of Frontex 
and a possible and sound way forward. 
1.2 Purpose 
Mapping the academic review of the reformation of Frontex is one way to 
better understand the whole European border and immigration policy field 
in its complex settings of power relations.  
The purpose is further to clarify the future role of Frontex and its 
responsibility by showing the discrepancies in the scholarship, an 
illustration of how complex and unclear the future role of Frontex still is. By 
using the perspectives I acknowledge three different views among scholars 
that create their own system with different legal implications in regard to the 
reformation of Frontex. The discrepancies in the perspectives hamper the 
paving of a clear European border and immigration policy especially 
regarding the role of Frontex.  
The three perspectives also give a greater understanding of how the 
perspectives on the role of Frontex interrelate, hence give us a better 
understanding of the inherent tensions in the complex policy field and a way 
forward for policies and regulations regarding Frontex and European 
immigration. 
The purpose is thus two-folded: the thesis demonstrates the complexity of 
the role of Frontex by applying the three perspectives to the current and 
future role of Frontex and pursue to clarify the role of Frontex and its 
reformation in the context of European integration by analysing the 
relationship and implications of the three different perspectives. 
1.3 Research Question 
The mapping of the subject entails a categorization of the relevant 
scholarship concerning the reformation of Frontex. By dividing the 
scholarship with the application of the perspectives: the democratic 
perspective, the integration perspective and the human rights perspective, 
the complexity of perceptions and opinions of the system are illuminated. A 
comparison of them is used as a tool to understand the various demands on 
the agency and the regulations, hence to achieve a better understanding of 
the complexity of Frontex’s role and the research field.  
Subsequently, I analyse the categories of scholarship and examine which 
legal regimes they relate to and which implications of the constitutional 
setting that are due to the proposals and demands regarding Frontex’s 
reformation. The academic review have scattered legal proposals and their 
rationale is anchored in the three different perspectives. This demonstrates 
                                                
7 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 
326/01, Title V: Area of freedom, security and justice, Art. 67-89 [TFEU]. 
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that the legal and political reformation of Frontex is problematic and 
challenging.  
The outcome from the two parts is examined with the aim of highlighting a 
pattern in the scholarship, which increases our understanding of Frontex’s 
policies and regulations in a lex ferenda perspective.  
The research questions I pursue to answer are 
1. What is the nature and rationale of the scholarly reviews of 
Frontex’s role and responsibilities?   
2. Which implications do the different reviews and proposals have? 
3. How can this give a better understanding of the existing role of 
Frontex? Can this understanding contribute to clarify the role and 
responsibilities of Frontex lex ferenda?  
1.4 Background  
Frontex was created in a turbulent period of shifting competences and 
powers. The competence to regulate the management of the external border 
was acquired with the Treaty of Amsterdam when the Schengen acquis was 
incorporated in the Treaty and made Union law.8 Policies from the third 
pillar in the Treaty establishing the European Union was transferred to title 
IV in the Treaty establishing the European Community.9 The transfer of 
powers within Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) to the first pillar was made 
partially and progressively, which implied transitional rules for five years 
(until 1 of May 2004).10 During the transitional period the European 
Commission (the Commission) had right of initiative together with the 
Member States. In addition the Council of the European Union (the 
Council) decided by voting unanimously after consulting the European 
Parliament (EP or the Parliament).11 When the period ended the 
Commission only needed to take into account the Member States proposals 
to the Council and as of 1 of January 2005 the co-decision procedure 
applied with majority-decision in the Council and in the Parliament.12  
The evolution of Frontex is part of a greater policy context that has emerged 
                                                
8 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts [1997] OJ C 340/01. 
9 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version) [1997] OJ C 340/02 [EU Treaty 1997] 
and Treaty establishing the European Community (Amsterdam Consolidated Version) 
[1997] OJ C 340/03 [EC Treaty 1997].  
10 EC Treaty 1997, supra note 9, Art 67.  
11 ibid, Art 67.1.  
12 Council Decision 2004/927/EC providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of Part 
Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure 
laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty [2004] OJ L 396/45. In accordance with Protocol No 
35 on Article 67 of the Treaty establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C 325/184, 
the Council acted as from 1 of May 2004 by qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the Parliament in order to adopt measures referred to in 
Article 66, that is measures regarding cooperation between Member States’ authorities and 
the Commission and those authorities. 
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inter alia through three multiannual policy programmes since 1999. The 
European Union has laid out its agenda for developing migration, border 
and asylum-related policies in the form of these programs, adopted by the 
European Council. The programmes set the guidelines for the development 
of policies in the field of freedom security and justice. The development of 
an Integrated Border Management (IBM), a framework in which Frontex 
should be seen, is addressed through these three programmes. 
1.4.1 From Tampere to Stockholm (1999-2014)  
In the Tampere Programme (1999-2004) the management of the external 
borders and the protection of the same were appointed the key priority of the 
policymaking in the Union by the European Council.13 Since the accession 
of the Schengen Convention in 1990 and the following entry into force of 
the Amsterdam Treaty the EU has gradually set in place a common policy 
on the management of the external borders of the Schengen area and 
uniform standards for border control have been adopted as EU legislation. 
Within the field the concept of border management (BM) and IBM has 
become an influential concept in policymaking.   
During the Finnish presidency efforts were made to consolidate the concept 
of IBM. Even though it was used as a pre-defined concept, it had a short 
history and implied various meanings, why the JHA Council found it 
necessary to define.14 The definition consists of five elements, which 
together establishes the conceptual framework. The first element is border 
control (checks and surveillance) including risk analysis and crime 
intelligence and secondly, detection and investigation of cross-border crime 
in cooperation with all competent law enforcement authorities. ‘The four-
tier access control model’ is the third element which consists of measures in 
third countries of origin or transit and cooperation with neighbouring 
countries, measures on border control at the external borders and control 
measures within the common area of free movement. Fourthly, inter-agency 
cooperation in border management including border guards, customs, 
police, national security and other relevant authorities, and lastly, 
coordination, cooperation and coherence at the national level and among all 
bodies and institutions on EU level.15  
IBM is perceived as an integrated part of a European comprehensive 
approach to migration. According to the Commission, operational activities 
designed to fight illegal immigration need to be read in a wider context of a 
                                                
13 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the 15-16 October 1999, SN 
200/99, 1, 4-5. 
14 S Carrera ’The EU Border Management Strategy: Frontex and the Challenges of Irregular 
Immigration in the Canary Islands’ Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Working 
Document no 261/March 2007, available at http://www.ceps.eu accessed 2 May 2013, 2-3 
[Carrera (2007)].  
15 Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs, 2768th Council Meeting, 
Brussels, 4-5 December 2006, Press Release, 15801/06, 27. 
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comprehensive approach to immigration.16 Frontex is a corollary of the 
development of IBM and a comprehensive approach to immigration, 
through which the common rules can be implemented efficiently and 
operational cooperation coordinated.17 The mechanism for operational 
cooperation was expressed as the solution to a need for better cooperation 
between Member States in the communication from the Commission 2002, 
and as one of the ‘mutually interdependent components’ in the development 
of a strong common border management.18 Another component was the 
burden-sharing concept, a concept seen as preceding the establishment of a 
European Corps of Border Guards. Today burden-sharing is at the heart of 
Frontex, together with the concept of solidarity between Member States. 
The development of IBM has ever since the beginning had a predominant 
practical nature, a common legislation was only one of five elements put 
forward in the Communication 2002 as constituting parts of a common 
BM.19 The Council’s action plan20 generally adopted the communication but 
emphasised the operational features and put less focus on financial burden-
sharing, common policies and expressed itself vaguely considering a 
common corpus of border guards.21  
The Hague Program (2005-2009) was a major accomplishment for the 
Dutch Presidency since the issue of migration and asylum had become 
increasingly political with the enlargement of the Union and the policy 
negotiations for the future required thorough negotiations. One of the 
characteristics of the Hague Programme was the emphasis on the threat of 
terrorism, timely as the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London occurred in 
2004-2005. It also stressed the cooperation with third countries, labelled as 
‘the external dimension of asylum and migration’.22  
The Stockholm Programme (2010-2014) was adopted in December 2009 by 
the European Council.23 Though building upon the Hague and Tampere 
                                                
16 Communication from the Commission to the Council, Reinforcing the management of 
the European Union’s Southern Maritime Borders COM (2006) 733 Final, 13. 
17 Frontex website, available at http://www.frontex.europa.eu/about/mission-and-tasks 
accessed 2 May 2013; Regulation (EU) 1169/2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) 
2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the management of operational cooperation 
at the external borders of the member states of the European Union [2011] OJ L 304/1, 
Preamble, recitals 2-4 [Frontex Amendment 2011].  
18 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Towards Integrated Management of the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union. COM (2002) 233 Final, Brussels 7.5.2002, 12. 
19 J Rijpma ’EU Border Management after the Lisbon Treaty’ (2009) 5 Croatian Yearbook 
of European Law and Policies (CYELP), 121, 132-133 [Rijpma (2009)]. 
20 Council of the European Union, ‘Plan for the management of the external borders of the 
Member States of the European Union’ Council Document 10019/02, Brussels 14.6.2002. 
21 J Monar ’The Project of a European Border Guard: Origins, Perspectives and Prospects 
in the Context of EU’s Integrated External Border Management’ in M Caparini and O 
Marenin (eds) Borders and Security Governance: Managing Borders in a Globalised World 
(Lit, Münster 2006) 200. 
22 European Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice 
in the European Union [2005] OJ C 53/1, 5. 
23 European Council, Conclusions 10-11 December 2009, EUCO 6/09, Brussels 11.12.09, 
9; The Stockholm Programme, supra note 6. 
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Programme it still has its own features, the overarching priority being ‘the 
interest and needs of the citizens’ and the challenge to ‘ensure respect for 
fundamental rights and freedoms and integrity of the person while 
guaranteeing security in Europe’.24 In this programme the European Council 
clearly demonstrates its view on the relation between a common European 
Asylum System and IBM when it states that: 
in order to maintain credible and sustainable immigration and asylum 
systems in the Union, it is necessary to prevent, control and combat 
illegal immigration as the Union faces increasing pressure from illegal 
migration flows, and particularly the Member States at its external 
borders, including at its Southern borders.25 
1.4.2 The Treaty of Lisbon 
The most recent and major change affecting this field is the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. The division of the first and third pillar disappeared 
when the pillar system was removed and replaced by one AFSJ where the 
Union and the Member States now have shared competences.26 Member 
States may thus act in the area to the extent that the Union have not 
exercised its competences and the Union must act in compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity.27 This ‘communitarisation’ also entails the 
extension of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), whose 
jurisdiction now covers the whole AFSJ. Despite the former exemption all 
national courts may refer a preliminary question to the ECJ due to the 
Lisbon treaty.28 There is still an exception of the possibility to review the 
legality and proportionality of the action taken by law enforcement agencies 
of the Member States, Art 276 TFEU.  
References to the ambitious agenda of Tampere: to develop common 
policies on asylum, borders and migration, was brought into the Treaty as 
well as the concept of solidarity, Art 77-80 TFEU. The concept of integrated 
management system for external borders was also for the first time 
mentioned by the Treaty.29  
The Charter of Fundamental Rights (ChFR) became legally binding and the 
Union, which now have legal personality, plans an accession of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). These measures can be 
expected to introduce human rights protection more, eg by imposing clear 
obligations upon the Union.30 The increased status of fundamental and 
                                                
24 The Stockholm Programme, supra note 6, 3; Carrera (2012), supra note 2, 238-239.  
25 The Stockholm Programme, supra note 6, 5. 
26 TFEU, supra note 7, Art 4.1 and 4.2 (j). 
27 TFEU, supra note 7, Art 2.2 and Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union 
[2012] OJ C 326/01, Art 5 [TEU]. 
28 EC Treaty 1997, supra note 9, Art 68, compare to TFEU, supra note 7, where the 
exception is deleted.  
29 Carrera (2012) supra note 2, 245-247. 
30 cf E Guild et al ’Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Impact 
on EU Home Affairs Agencies: Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support 
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human rights can be emphasized as a significant aspect that will improve 
mutual trust between Member States.31 
1.5 Method and Theory  
1.5.1 Categorization  
In the third chapter I present and analyse the different categories of review 
presented in the debate about Frontex and its development. First of all it is 
essential to acknowledge that the categorization of the scholarship is 
constructed and developed as a tool for analysis. My three categories are not 
intended to cover or represent all views of scholars active within the field of 
research; it is only a snapshot of scholarly views and lex ferenda proposals 
considering Frontex, used as an instrument for demonstration. As a 
constructed categorization it reflects my personal perception of the system. 
When categorizing the scholarship I have had some questions in mind, 
hoping for a categorization as sufficient as possible:   
• What is expressed as the main objective of Frontex? 
• What is expressed as the main weakness of Frontex? 
• How do the arguments differ between sources?  
• Why are they different? Is it because the authors have different 
perceptions of how the system works? Or is it because the have 
different opinions on how the system should work? 
These questions are a vital part of the demonstration and categorization of 
the system as a dispersed system since they pursue to acknowledge the 
rationale behind the variation and sometimes the contradiction in the 
scholarly debate of the role of Frontex. Consequently, the categorisation by 
these questions gives us a greater understanding of the possible ways to 
perceive and conceive European immigration policies and especially 
Frontex’s role.  
Firstly, the integration perspective represents a view that stresses the fact 
that AFSJ is one of the main integrating policy areas in the Union.32 This 
approach uses the rhetoric of solidarity, burden-sharing, enhanced efficiency 
and protection when promoting European integration while at the same time 
acknowledging the national prerogatives. The concept of efficiency can be 
understood as the use of best management practices in terms of controlling 
borders and irregular migration, labelled administrative efficiency in this 
thesis. AFSJ is a field where sovereignty traditionally has been 
unchallenged and remained exclusively with the Member States but where 
                                                                                                                        
Office’, a study requested by the European Parliamant, Policy Department C - Citizens' 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 12, 14 [Guild et al (2011)].   
31 A Kellerman ’Constitutional Developments since the Lisbon Treaty in the Area of 
Security, Freedom and Justice at Supranational and National Level’ (2011) 87 Amicus 
Curiae, 10. 
32 Carrera (2012), supra note 2, 229. 
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policy convergence, common regulations and executive cooperation yet 
have developed.  
Solidarity and responsibility sharing has been in the EU migration and 
border vocabulary since the beginning of the Europeanization of border 
control and asylum systems. The risk that responsibility sharing becomes a 
costly situation for a single State, a situation that creates political tensions 
and intensifies over time, militates against the idea of solidarity for those 
States not being States of origin, transit, first asylum or Border States.33 
However, there are various incentives of a responsibility sharing system 
both regarding the protection and reception of immigrants and border 
control and surveillance. The main incentive is the promotion of European 
integration, an overarching goal, which in itself can be perceived to entail 
stronger external borders, more effective refugee and asylum protection and 
a distribution of the faced challenges that combats free riding. According to 
Shuck, this would function as an insurance from huge and sudden 
migration-flows, which must be valuable, even though to a greater extent for 
some States than others, for all States within the Schengen area.34 One 
Member State’s migration control and border management have effect, not 
only in neighbouring States, but all Schengen States.35 
Secondly, the democratic perspective represents an approach to Frontex that 
focus on the level of participation of the Parliament and the transparency in 
the agency. It entails a democratic concern regarding the establishment of 
Frontex and the decision making process within the agency. But it also 
implies a concern for the democratic influences or lack of them in the level 
of policy making. Legitimacy is a keyword and used as a starting point for 
scholars scrutiny.  
Thirdly, the human rights perspective is perhaps the easiest to distinguish. 
The primary focus for this perspective is the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of the individual human being. The point of departure of this 
perspective is the international obligations conferred upon Member States 
through ratification of international instruments such as the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and ECHR as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights, now 
also legally binding upon the EU institutions. The focus rests on the respect, 
protection and fulfilment of the right of the individual immigrant whose 
situation is acknowledged to be extra vulnerable, especially if the person is 
an undocumented immigrant.  
The IBM and the asylum acquis are not perceived as two European legal 
systems, but a set of measures analysed in relation to their ability to respect, 
protect and fulfil the right of refugees and the right to seek asylum.  
                                                
33 P Shuck ’Refugee Burden- Sharing: A Modest Proposal’ (1997) 22 Yale J. Int'l L. 243, 
249. 
34 ibid, 249-250. 
35 K Groenendijk ’Introduction: Migration and Law in Europe’ in E Guild and P 
Minderhoud (eds), The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law (Martinius Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2012) 10-11. 
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1.5.2 Power and Control  
This thesis shows that the underlying theme in the scholarly debate on 
Frontex is the question of power and control. Frontex debates are concerned 
with regulatory power, that is the competence to regulate about border 
control. The debates are also concerned with management control, that is 
how Frontex is operated as an agency. 
I argue that the perspectives can, as an analytical tool, demonstrate the 
inherent struggle between the member States and the EU institutions for 
regulatory power and management control over the migration and border 
control and hence over Frontex as an agency. Simultaneously, the 
perspectives show that the struggle pervades all perceptions of the role of 
the agency and all policy recommendations, ever so detailed and technical.  
1.6 General Delimitations  
This thesis is set out to analyse lex ferenda proposals in scholarship 
regarding Frontex’s role and responsibilities. The material concerned only 
with Frontex’s current situation will fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
Usually lex lata analyses are followed by some proposals for future policy 
and law making so this two elements become intertwined in scholarly 
articles and books. However, the focus of this study will be on the 
scholarship concerned with lex ferenda proposals. The delimitation is 
relevant because of the need to narrow down the scope. It also corresponds 
to the problem, presented under subsection 1.1, that Frontex, as an agency 
established in a certain immigration policy and border control environment, 
is difficult to develop, reform or transform due to the separate perspectives 
and systems in the policy field.  
Frontex is an agency with broad tasks and competences within several 
different areas. Its broad mandate has resulted in necessary delimitations in 
this endeavour. Frontex’s data processing competence is one field I have not 
been able to address, nor its mandate to perform pilot projects aiming at 
developing second generation IBM, as the recent development of a 
European border surveillance system (EUROSUR).36  
Further delimitations within the human rights perspective are necessary to 
highlight. Human rights scholars have contributed with many studies about 
Frontex in which the issues of extraterritorialisation, that is extraterritorial 
application of human rights and the attributability of wrongful acts to multi-
layered actors based on International law. This study cannot include such 
thorough and in-depth investigations of the legal issues surrounding 
extraterritorial border management. Neither have my intention been to cover 
aspects of International law instead I limited this thesis to Union law and 
policies.  
                                                
36 Regarding EUROSUR cf Frontex Amendment 2011, supra note 17, Art 2.1 (h-i). 
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1.7 Material 
It is fundamental to reiterate that my mapping of the scholarship is 
obviously not intended to be exhaustive but simply a glimpse of the relevant 
scholarship. However, the chosen literature has played a significant role in 
our understanding of the current role and future development of Frontex. It 
is my hope that it will offer a good understanding of the whole policy field. 
The lowest common denominator of the chosen literature is the focus on the 
development of Frontex, that is a lex ferenda perspective, which also 
requires certain attention to the current situation.37  
Since the legal basis for Frontex transformed with the entry into force of 
Lisbon and with the amendment of the Frontex Regulation in 2011, I find 
my thesis an important contribution in a territory with a scarce amount of 
updated research. Naturally this also implies specific challenges as a 
corollary to a virgin territory. I have analysed the material with backdrop of 
the latest legal developments in hope to contribute with a more updated 
analysis of Frontex. 
1.8 Outline  
Chapter one contains an introduction to the subject and a presentation of the 
purpose of the thesis. Theory and method are explained as well as the 
delimitations and the material of the essay. 
Chapter two provides, as a point of departure, a brief insight into the 
establishment of Frontex, its current mission, mandate and powers. This 
constitutes the foundation for the further analysis of its future role. 
Chapter three demonstrates how the academic review of the development of 
Frontex can be captured and mapped by applying three perspectives. It 
further proves that the review cannot merely be accommodated in the three 
perspectives but the categorization also contributes to a greater 
understanding of the role of Frontex and the legal settings for the 
development of Frontex. It connects the different lex ferenda proposals with 
political and legal implications in the integration debate. 
Chapter four contains an analysis of the three perspectives and their 
respective recommendations of the evolution of Frontex. It seeks to show 
that the categorized review and the lex ferenda recommendations helps us 
better understand Frontex’s uncertain role by looking at the integration 
process through the lenses of the three different perspectives, which also can 
be perceived as three sub-contexts in the integration debate.   
                                                
37 For further reading on Frontex, not addressed in this thesis, see inter alia the security 
debate E Guild and S Carrera ’Towards an Internal (In)security Strategy for the EU?’ 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Liberty and Security in Europe, January 2011, 
available at http://www.ceps.eu accessed 12 May 2013; V Georgiev ’Towards a Common 
European Security Policy’ (2010) 19 European Security, 255-274; S Léonard ’EU Border 
Security and Migration into the European Union: Frontex and Securitization through 
practices’ (2010) 19 European Security, 231-254.   
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2 Frontex  
2.1 Establishment and Legal Basis 
Following the lack of concrete progress or failure regarding the 
establishment of a common European corpus of border guards, the Greek 
Presidency of the European Council revitalized the idea of a common 
management of the external borders.38 The proposal was adopted by the 
Commission in November 2003 for transmission to the Parliament, the 
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions.39 Frontex was established following year, in 2004.  The 
establishment has its legal basis in Article 66 and 62(2)(a) EC Treaty, Art 
74 and Art 77(2)(b) and (d) in TFEU. In the original proposal there was no 
reference to Art 62(2)(a) but the Member States insisted on complementing 
the proposal with a reference to the article about control and surveillance of 
the external borders.40   
The effective implementation of the common rules for border management 
was perceived to require increased coordination of operational 
cooperation.41 The overarching aim of the agency is to improve the 
integrated management of external borders of the Member States.42 
Regarding the division of responsibility between Member States and 
Frontex, the regulation stresses that the responsibility for border control and 
surveillance lies with the Member States. They may, according to Art 2.2, 
continue operational cooperation with other States where such measures 
complement Frontex’s action. However, they have an obligation to report 
such actions taken outside the framework of the agency and to refrain from 
activities that could jeopardize the objectives of Frontex. The agency should 
merely facilitate and streamline the application of Community measures in 
the field of IBM by coordinating Member States action of implementation.43  
Frontex’s main tasks to accomplish this improvement of border control and 
promote the concept of solidarity between Member States, are enumerated 
in Art 2: coordination of operational cooperation, assist Member States with 
training of border guards, carry out risk analyses, follow up research 
development on border control, technical and operational assistance in 
situations requiring extra assistance and to provide necessary support 
organizing return operations.44 Thus, the managerial role of Frontex is 
                                                
38 Thessaloniki European Council, Presidency Conclusions of 19-20 June 2003, 11638/03, 
Brussels 1.10.2003, 4; A Neal ’Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of 
Frontex’ (2009) 47 J.Com.Mar.St., 333, 342. 
39 The European Commission, Minutes from the 1634th meeting held in Brussel 11 
November 2003, PV (2003)1634 Final, 13-14. 
40 V Mitsilegas ’Border Security in the European Union: Towards Centralized Control and 
Maximum Surveillance’ in A Baldaccini, E Guild and H Toner (eds), Whose Freedom, 
Security and Justice? (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 367 [Mitsilegas 2007].  
41 Frontex Regulation, supra note 4, Preamble, recital 2. 
42 ibid, Art 1.1. 
43 ibid, Art 1.2. 
44 ibid, Art 2. 
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emphasized in the very first articles even though the executive powers of the 
agency are not excluded in the regulation.45 The regulation states that staff 
of the agency and experts of Member States acting in another Member State 
shall be subject to the national law of the host State.46 
Frontex was explicitly given legal personality in the regulation with the 
intent that it should be independent in technical matters.47 The creation of 
Frontex is often seen as a compromise between the Commission’s wish to 
establish a common European corps of border guards and the Member 
States’ unwillingness to transfer powers to the supranational level in this 
field. In that regard, Frontex can be said to represent a compromise between 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.  
The Schengen Borders Code (SBC), a consolidation and development of the 
Schengen acquis, governs the border control of the external borders of EU 
and constitutes a common standard on border control and surveillance.48 It 
contains not only provisions on control of persons at border crossing points 
and surveillance between those points but also analyses of risks and threats 
to internal security. SBC defines what conditions a third country national 
that wishes to enter the EU must meet. The code provides harmonization but 
also a more transparent set of rules regarding crossing the external border of 
the EU than available before. 
The preamble states that the border control shall fully respect human 
dignity, the principle of proportionality, non-discrimination and is without 
prejudice to persons seeking international protection, these persons even fall 
outside the scope of the SBC.49 The preamble confirms that operational 
cooperation between Member States regarding border control shall be 
managed by Frontex.50 SBC was adopted one year after Frontex had become 
operational and with the entry into force, it can be argued that a clearer 
framework for Frontex emerged.51  
The first phase of Frontex existence with a pure managerial role and a small 
budget could not provide sufficient assistance to Member States considering 
that from time to time, large number of third nationals arrived to Member 
States to enter their territory illegally. This perception of the situation led to 
the adoption of a regulation introducing RABIT teams in 2007 (the RABIT 
Regulation).52 The RABIT teams can be deployed on request of a Member 
                                                
45 ibid, Art 8 and 10.  
46 ibid, Art 10. 
47 ibid, Art 15. 
48 Regulation (EC) 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March        
2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code) [2006] OJ L 105/01. 
49 ibid, Preamble, recital 7 and Art 3(b).   
50 ibid, Preamble, recital 13. 
51 Carrera (2010), supra note 3, 8. 
52 Regulation (EC) 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council 
Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 as regards that mechanisms and regulating the tasks and 
powers of guest officers [2007] OJ L 199/30, Preamble, recital 4 [RABIT Regulation]. 
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State in an urgent and exceptional situation of pressure from irregular 
migration.53  
The mechanism is inter alia an answer to the strains on Member States’ 
capacity to perform the initial assessment of especially mixed flows of 
immigrants at the southern maritime border.54 In 2006, the Commission 
stressed that this situation was one of the biggest challenges to an effective 
border control and implied a need for manpower, which could be satisfied in 
a rapid and flexible way through a pool of border guard experts, made 
available by other Member States.55 This mechanism of sharing resources 
would be an expression of practical solidarity between Member States and 
the Commission invited the Council to examine the establishment of such 
mechanism.56 According to Art 4.3 RABIT Regulation, Member States shall 
make border guards available for Frontex, which means that the voluntary 
basis emphasized by the Commission has been expressed in an imperative 
language in the final regulation. RABIT teams may be called upon on a 
five-day notice and may be deployed for a short time period.57 The 
mechanism can be considered significant for developing an ‘on call’ force 
of border guards; perhaps a forerunner of a permanent European system of 
border guards.58  
In this context one would have to consider the Council Decision 
2010/252/EU supplementing the SBC (the Frontex Sea Border Rule).59 The 
rule was adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Art 12.5 
SBC governing border surveillance. It is specified in the article that the 
comitology procedure is applicable for additional measures supplementing 
non-essential elements of the SBC. The rule has been considered an attempt 
to harmonize interception practices and to give Frontex maritime operations 
a legal framework.60 It entails legally binding norms for conducting border 
controls at sea and non-binding guidelines regarding search and rescue 
situations. However, the EP opposed the adoption and filed a complaint to 
the ECJ, which ruled that the decision considered essential parts of SBC and 
should therefore be subject to the ordinary co-decision procedure. The rule 
                                                
53 ibid, Art 12.5 (8a). 
54 Communication from the Commission to the Council, Reinforcing the management of 
the European Union's Southern Maritime Borders, COM (2006) 733 final, Brussels 
30.11.2006, 9.  
55 ibid. 
56 ibid. 
57 RABIT Regulation, supra note 52, Art 12.5 (Art 8d.9). 
58 J Rijpma, ’Hybrid Agencification in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and its 
inherent tensions: the Case of Frontex’ in M Busuioc, M Groenleer and J Trondal (eds), The 
Agency Phenomenon in the European Union: Emergence, institutionalisation and everyday 
decision-making (Manchester University Press, Manchester 2012) 94 [Rijpma (2012)]. 
59 Council Decision 2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders 
Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational 
cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union [2010] 
OJ L 111/20 [Frontex Sea Border Rule]. 
60 M den Heijer, Europe and Extraterrritorial Asylum (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2012) 200 
[den Heijer (2012)].  
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was annulled but remains in force until the decision has been replaced. The 
Commission intended to present a new proposal in early 2013.61  
The next legislative development occurred 2011 when amendments to 
Frontex Regulation were adopted.62 The first recital demonstrates one of the 
objectives of the amendments, the increased concern for human rights. The 
new recital provided an added context for Frontex and stressed the 
development of a comprehensive European migration policy based on 
human rights, solidarity and responsibility as a key objective of the Union.  
Formally, the whole amendment was an answer to a call for clarification and 
enhancement of Frontex’s role set out in the Stockholm Programme, a 
development in line with the objective of the Union to gradually introduce 
IBM.63 In accordance with this objective the mandate of the agency was 
strengthened, especially its operational capabilities while ensuring that all 
measures are proportionate to the pursued objectives, effective and totally 
respect fundamental rights and the rights of refugees and asylum seekers.64 
The amendment pursues to address inter alia three problems identified and 
expressed in the impact assessment accompanying the amendment 
proposal.65 Firstly, the operational cooperation was still considered 
inefficient and insufficient. Secondly, the operational solidarity had proved 
to be unsatisfactory, which was well illustrated by the actual deployment of 
equipment. Thirdly, Frontex was not considered to use its potential in the 
best possible way, in terms of coordination of operational cooperation and 
support to the Member States in carrying out the border management, due to 
unclear or insufficient existing legal provisions.66 It is noteworthy that the 
Commission stressed the unclear division of tasks and responsibilities 
between Frontex and Member States as a part of the overall unclear legal 
framework, especially in regard to the development of Frontex activities 
since its inception in 2004.67  
To strengthen Frontex’s operational activity the amendment inserted a 
compulsory contribution of technical equipment and human resources for 
Member States. Regarding the technical equipment the amendment 
introduced the possibility for Frontex to acquire, itself or in co-ownership 
with Member States, technical equipment so as to safeguard the need for 
equipment even in rapid interventions.68 It introduced a mandatory 
contribution of a minimum number of equipment by the Member States to a 
                                                
61 To my knowledge, no such proposal has been presented (to date, 20 May 2013). 
62 Frontex Amendment 2011, supra note 17.  
63 The Stockholm Programme, supra note 6, 26. 
64 Frontex Amendment 2011, supra note 17, Preamble, recital 7-9.  
65 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal 
for a Regulation (EU) 1169/2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 
establishing a European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the 
external borders of the member states of the European Union (FRONTEX), SEC (2010) 
149, Brussels, 24.2.2010 [Impact Assessment].  
66 ibid, 11-14. 
67 ibid, 14. 
68 Frontex Amendment 2011, supra note 17, Art 7. 
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centralized record of technical equipment functioning as a pool of 
equipment, compared to the previous setting of a voluntary similar system.69 
The obligatory contribution is negotiated and decided in a bilateral 
agreement once a year.70  
The increased human resources and streamlining of joint operations (JO(s)) 
led to a range of reforms and amendments. European Border Guard Teams 
replaced the concept of RABITs. The new teams can be deployed during 
rapid interventions, pilot projects and joint operations.71 The Frontex 
Regulation did not govern the use of border guards in JOs before this 
amendment, only the deployment of RABITs. Frontex has deployed border 
guards in joint operations despite this silence, so called Frontex Joint 
Support Teams, but these arrangements had an uncertain legal basis until 
governed by the amendment.  
Member States’ contribution of border guards to a border guard pool and the 
secondment of border guards to the agency were made compulsory unless 
‘they are faced with an exceptional situation substantially affecting the 
discharge of national tasks’ or it will ‘seriously affect the discharge of 
national tasks’.72 The contribution is agreed upon an annual basis.73  
The power to initiate and carry out joint operations now lies firmly with the 
agency since amending the regulation. The expression that Frontex may 
launch initiatives itself, ‘and in agreement with the Member States 
concerned’ is deleted and replaced by ‘The Agency may itself initiate and 
carry out joint operations and pilot projects in cooperation with the Member 
State(s) concerned and in agreement with the host Member States’.74 In 
addition the amendment gave Frontex use of operational plans a legal basis, 
specifications on what the plan should cover and how to agree upon it, as 
well as how to implement it. These detailed provisions could facilitate the 
planning and the evaluation of operations in relation to the objectives of 
Frontex notwithstanding their ad hoc nature. They could also facilitate the 
cooperation while it prevents that officials from Member States and Frontex 
expect different in terms of the objective of the operation and corresponding 
modus operandi, a problem acknowledged by the Commission in its Impact 
Assessment.75 The Commission concluded that, as a result of the previous 
lack of legal clarification of Frontex, the efficiency of the cooperation was 
affected and the role and responsibilities of Frontex were often 
misunderstood.76 To comply with the new provision regarding operational 
plans the agency would need to address, amongst other, geographical area, 
planned duration, tasks and instructions for the guest officers, composition 
                                                
69 ibid, Art 7.3. 
70 ibid.  
71 cf ibid, Art 1a.1a.  
72 ibid, Art 3b.2-3. 
73 ibid.  
74 ibid, Art 3.1. 
75 Impact Assessment, supra note 65, 13-14. 
76 ibid. 
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of teams, command and control provisions.77 
Frontex may now include an evaluation of Member States’ border capacities 
in the risk analyses, a reinforced evaluation mandate, especially in 
combination with the emphasis on detailed evaluations of joint operations.78 
A possibility for Frontex to terminate a JO or pilot project is inserted if the 
conditions for such activity no longer are fulfilled and participating Member 
States may ask Frontex to terminate a JO or pilot project. An obligation to 
terminate or suspend such activity if violations of fundamental rights or 
International law are serious or likely to persist is inserted in the 
amendments, but only for the Executive Director.79 
The amended provisions govern the cooperation with third countries 
compared to the previous Frontex Regulation and stress the compliance with 
fundamental and human rights. Frontex may conclude working agreements 
with third countries and the border authority of third countries while 
respecting the external relations policy of the Union, Union law, 
International law and while promoting European border management 
standards, also covering respect for fundamental rights and human dignity. 
The agency may also deploy Liaison Officers that take part of the local or 
regional cooperation network; these arrangements may only be engaged in 
countries that comply with minimum human rights standards.80 
The emphasis on human rights safeguards is also expressed in several 
provisions in the Amendment.81 The agency is obliged to draw up and 
develop a Fundamental Rights Strategy and as part of the monitoring 
mechanism there shall be a Consultative Forum and a Fundamental Rights 
Officer (FRO) with full access to all information on the activities of 
Frontex.82 The FRO shall report on a regular basis directly to the 
Management Board and the Consultative Forum and thereby contribute to a 
monitoring mechanism. The role of the Consultative Forum is more of an 
adviser, it shall assist the Management Board in fundamental rights matters 
and it shall be consulted when developing and implementing the 
Fundamental Rights Strategy, Code of Conduct and Common Core 
Curricula. The Management Board shall decide the composition of the 
Forum and it must invite external bodies to participate in the Forum.83  
                                                
77 Frontex Amendment 2011, supra note 17, Art 3. 
78 ibid, Art 3.3 and 4. 
79 ibid, Art 3.1a. 
80 ibid, Art 14.3. 
81 Even though cooperation agreements with UNHCR and the European Fundamental 
Rights Agency (FRA) were concluded before the 2011 amendments. See, UNHCRs 
website, http://www.unhcr.org/4d948c736.html and FRA website, 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/891-Cooperation-Agreement-FRA-
Frontex_en.pdf both accessed 21 May 2013. 
82 Frontex Amendment 2011, supra note 17, Art 26a. 
83 ibid, Art 26a.2.  
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3 Understanding the Academic 
Review of Frontex 
When discussing Frontex reformation and development the questions of 
power and control must be addressed. The power struggle over Frontex as 
an agency is easy to acknowledge as well as the different voices considering 
who should exercise control functions over the agency. I argue that these 
two issues are crucial to address to better understand the role and potential 
of Frontex and a precondition to find a way forward for the common 
European border management and in particular for Frontex. These unsolved 
questions are the underlying rationale for the different voices surrounding 
Frontex with different policy proposals.  
Frontex is set in the context of shared Union competence regarding both 
border management and migration, resulting in fundamental questions 
regarding the division of competences and the control over specific areas. 
Shared competence shall be exercised according to the principle of 
subsidiarity, Art 5.3 TEU. The Union may thus act if the objectives pursued 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States on local, regional or 
central level but can rather be better achieved by the EU. The three 
perspectives are envisaged to demonstrate the inherent tensions and 
struggles between sub-contexts within the Frontex integration debate.  
Considering this, the evaluation of power and control over Frontex from 
three different perspectives contributes to the increased understanding of the 
role of Frontex and hence to a greater understanding of the way forward in 
law and policies for European Immigration Policies, in particular the 
European Border Agency. 
This chapter presents the three perspectives separately, each subsection 
divided in an initial presentation of the relevant perspective followed by a 
presentation of their main concerns. Subsequently, the lex ferenda 
recommendations are elaborated followed by a brief reflection of their 
implications and finally a sub-analysis.  
3.1 From an Integration Perspective 
The integration perspective constitutes a view of Frontex in the context of 
pursued European integration. The role of the agency is scrutinized in the 
context of promoting a common IBM and the integration of the AFSJ.  
The ‘de-pillarisation’ of the EU structure transferred the whole AFSJ into 
shared competence. However, when it comes to the issue of borders and 
migration it is remarkable how the principle of sovereignty inherent in these 
concepts makes the policy field utmost sensitive and affects the Member 
States’ will to transfer their competence. The competence remains with the 
Member States as long as it is not transferred to the Union. The 
supranational power within this policy field will hence be dependent on the 
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way Member States exercise their national competences in the area and are 
willing to transfer their competences. The abolition of the pillar structure 
has been considered a prerequisite for ‘comprehensive, legitimate, efficient, 
transparent and democratic responses to the dilemmas posed by the 
Europeanization processes and the creation of a common AFSJ’.84 Despite 
the abolition of the pillar structure, the Lisbon Treaty does not ensure a 
complete communitarisation of JHA policies. Additionally, even though 
Frontex is an independent Union agency the features of 
intergovernmentalism dominate Frontex. According to Curtin, this is a 
natural corollary to the fact that the powers are not delegated from the 
Commission but rather a ’’Europeanization’ of the functions of the 
administrations of the Member States’.85 Intertwined with the concepts of 
citizenship, security and political community it is still a political sensitive 
area to integrate. It will continue to be ‘equally driven by member states’ 
preferences as well as by a culture of “intensive intergovernmentalism”’.86 
Wolff predicts these features to persist since the Union and the Member 
States have shared competences in the area.87  
The step forward towards a common European policy on external borders is 
evaluated in terms of efficiency, improved cooperation, a consistent border 
policy and implementation and democratic accountability, thus the 
perceived features of an integrated border management. These four 
parameters are generally understood as the added value of a European 
common border policy or an integrated border management.88 
The main rationale of IBM presented and promoted by the EU institutions 
can be retrieved from the outline of what integrated border management 
includes but also from the preamble of the Frontex Regulation, which 
highlights uniform control and surveillance, efficient implementation and 
solidarity between Member States.89 The democratic accountability has been 
more of a scholarly concern than that of the legislatures, even though the 
Commission mentioned it briefly when elaborating the notion of integrated 
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border management.90 Recently, this has been addressed by the Commission 
in a communication to the Council and the EP in regard to a perceived need 
for an increased legislative attention towards regulatory agencies inter alia 
concerning their accountability.91 The concern of democratic accountability 
will mostly be addressed under subsection 3.2 since it is more of a 
subordinate concern for the perspective reviewed in this section. 
3.1.1 European Integration 
Building upon the cooperation networks, the Strategic Committee on 
Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (Scifa) and the External Borders 
Practitioners Common Unit (PCU), and with the contentious aim of creating 
a European corps of border guards postponed in the earlier debate, the 
Thessaloniki European Council called upon the Commission to investigate 
the feasibility of creating new institutional mechanisms.92 The Commission, 
which had been in favour of a European border police, responded quickly by 
tabling a proposal for a regulation establishing a European Border Agency.93 
The Council reached a swift political agreement on the draft regulation and 
the tasks allocated to the agency by the Commission. However, the 
European Council disagreed regarding the composition of the Management 
Board resulting in a revised provision in the final regulation. Due to the 
choice of a rapid legislative process, to avoid the co-decision procedure 
applying after the transitional rules of the Treaty of Amsterdam, as of 1 
January 2005, the EP was only consulted in the legislative process.94 The 
proposals of the EP favouring a more centralized agency were hence largely 
ignored. The proposals regarding the composition of the Management Board 
demonstrate the three different camps in the struggle of control over the new 
body. According to the original proposal by the Commission it would 
consist of twelve members and two representatives of the Commission. 
However, the Council envisaged the Board as composed of representatives 
from each Member State plus two from the Commission. The EP considered 
that six representatives from Member States should be balanced with as 
many from the Commission, opting for the most centralized agency.95  
The establishment of Frontex demonstrates how the operational cooperation 
in border management has been gradually communitarised, similar to the 
communitarisation of the competences in border management.96 Frontex’s 
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predecessor, the Common Unit (Scifa+), consisted of the Council’s working 
group Scifa and the heads of Member State border control services, and was 
replaced by PCU. If you look at Scifa+ and PCU as purely 
intergovernmental or partly communitarised, the transfer of operational 
cooperation to Frontex has entailed a shift of competences from the Member 
States to the more supranational approach of a Union agency.97 A delegation 
of competences to an agency often denotes a vertical competence transferral 
rather than, or together with, a horizontal transferral from the Commission 
to the agency why the delegation should be labelled Europeanization.98 The 
level of the Europeanization can still be subject to debate. 
Even though the management of external border falls within the scope of 
Union regulatory competence, it is questionable whether Union legislation 
can block Member States’ powers considering that the operational activities 
within border management might be linked to Member States’:  
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political 
and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It 
shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the 
territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
safeguarding national security.99   
It is further doubtful if operational cooperation unlike legislative measures 
can limit the institutional autonomy of Member States, ie how implementing 
powers are exercised and allocated to national authorities.100 
The creation of Frontex was an institutional answer to the task of promoting 
the principle of solidarity and integrated border management through 
optimising operational cooperation. The establishment can be seen in the 
context of the fifth Union enlargement, which caused imbalances between 
new and old Member States since new States came in charge of a great share 
of the external border; a challenge to the project of European solidarity.101 
Two more rationale for the creation of Frontex can be added, namely the 
fact that migration has ‘generally become an increasingly contentious issue’ 
in Europe since the 1990s and the terror attack on 11 September 2001.102 In 
this context, the emergence of IBM and creation of Frontex are subject to 
three rationales and already in the very beginning part of three different 
debates: the security debate, the populist and politicized debate and the 
actual challenge with a scattered external border and Member States with 
completely different situations and agendas.  
One of Frontex’s main challenges in regard to trust-building and an efficient 
and coherent operational cooperation is the fact that 27 (up to date) different 
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States and even more authorities are included in the Union. The solidarity 
concept is thus difficult to implement since the States have completely 
different preconditions, some with huge parts of external border and some 
with almost none, as well as different interests, threat perceptions and 
objectives.103 As a result there have been different understandings on how to 
best handle the borders and the irregular migration.  
The Member States’ move to establish a coordination agency can be 
perceived as a way, for affected States to find a collective solution, 
promoted in particular by southern European States with a high financial 
and political cost in regard to immigration. This resulted in the other 
Member States opting for the less integrationist solution so as to remain the 
control over the border management.104 The explanation is a sound rationale 
for the intergovernmental and hence political features of the agency. In 
addition, the Frontex Regulation is a development of the Schengen acquis, a 
highly intergovernmental foundation not meant to restrain the Schengen 
States or create monitoring mechanisms. Rather it is argued that the 
Schengen States wanted to escape such control at national level.105  
Lack of trust is also acknowledged within AFSJ as fuelling a certain 
competition between national authorities when negotiating, adopting and 
implementing developments. The national authorities still see each other as 
rivals and the competition hampers the exchange of information at EU and 
national levels. A proof of this lack of trust is the Prüm Treaty, adopted in 
2005 between seven EU Member States to accelerate exchange of 
information within fields covered by AFSJ. Scholars have argued that the 
Prüm Treaty not only established a close cooperation between the 
signatories, but also challenged the political power of the European AFSJ. 
Arguably, the Prüm Treaty weakened the Union more than it strengthened it 
by creating a hierarchy within the EU, by competing with the ‘principle of 
availability’ and by excluding the Parliament.106 
The external borders policy of the Union is founded upon an assumption 
that EU effectively can ensure a correct, coherent and consistent application 
of the EU policies and laws across the Member States of Europe. The 
assurance is a key element for promoting mutual trust. However, this 
assumption is contested, while the monitoring and evaluation mechanism is 
perceived as insufficient to ensure the full and efficient implementation of 
European border policies and laws or its application through good 
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administration by Member States’ national, regional and local authorities.107 
The official discourse within the Union uses expressions like ‘coherent and 
integrated border management’ but is alleged to be a false presumption 
about the coherency and stability of the border because of the diversities in 
the territorial parts of the external border and the fact that the external 
border do not correspond to the territorial demarcations of the Union.108 
According to a study performed by Egeberg and Trondal, the question 
whether Frontex as an EU agency contributes to a transformation towards a 
more integrated political, administrative and legal order within the Union is 
depending on the degree of independency.109 However, the agency does not 
have to be independent in general but needs to be independent from the 
Member States in practice. A strong relationship with the Commission was 
thus not seen as an obstacle. To apply this on Frontex is to examine the 
actual independence or dependence of the agency.110   
In contrast to the first proposal by the Commission, Frontex ‘lost’ some of 
the more intergovernmental features due to severe criticism from the 
Parliament, such as national experts and a distinction between national 
members of the Management Board and the representatives of the 
Commission. Instead it gained a more balanced structure, admittedly with 
one representative from each Member State but with two equal 
representatives from the Commission and majority decisions. This can be 
said to denote a rather balanced, professional and autonomous agency, 
which provides Frontex with an added value for its promotion of solidarity 
and mutual trust.111 
During the first years of Frontex the trust from Member States was the 
crucial element, which determined whether the agency would embody a 
decisive step forward or not. The structure of the agency is carefully placed 
partly in the hands of the Member States, which together with the Council’s 
expression of the possibility to extend the competences of the agency at an 
appropriate time, seemed to imply good conditions for trust building.112 
The independent and professional nature of Frontex has been contested after 
a glance at some of the operations launched under Frontex coordination. 
Wolff describes an internal challenge in terms of Member States’ divergent 
interests and states that the common border management is a chaotic 
process. 113 She demonstrates her thesis by turning to some of the conducted 
joint maritime operations.114 
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Operations in the Mediterranean have often been launched on a short-term 
basis in a context of emergency on the call from certain Member States 
holding, in particular the maritime external border, which opens up for 
political pressure. Carrera posts the example of Spain and the Canary 
Islands to show how Spain’s national politics transcended to a European 
level when calls for Frontex operations was used to shift the blame within 
the political struggles between the Spanish government, the opposition and 
the government of the Canary Islands. The effect was three JOs based on 
political pressure and calls for emergency.115  
Frontex remains to be based on national servants accountable to national 
parliaments. Schout and Wolff claim that the establishment of Frontex 
hardly implied integration since Frontex did not receive an independent role 
and did not shift the control towards the Union institutions.116 The 
composition of the management Board is evidential, most of the 
representatives have been head of the border guard service, but there are 
also some that come from national ministries. This is a fact that may result 
in political discussions and considerations within the Board.117 
Carrera affirms that Frontex is politicized because of exercising its 
competences in a very political environment without being immune to the 
environmental impact.118  
Firstly, the dependence on Member States’ solidarity is considered to be 
intertwined with the fundamental mandate given to Frontex, to facilitate the 
implementation of Union policies through coordination of operational 
cooperation at the external borders of Member States. 119 The principle of 
sovereignty is naturally still inherent in the field of borders. 
Secondly, the Frontex Regulation stresses the responsibility for border 
control as lying with the Member States. Frontex’s name is a reminder of 
the focus on Member States, ‘The European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union’.120 After negotiations over the proposal for a founding 
regulation between the Commission and the Council, Art 2.2 was added to 
clarify the division of competences between Frontex and Member States and 
to avoid the exclusive competence of the Union. This is evidential of the 
struggle of the control over Frontex between the Union and the Member 
States.121  
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Carrera’s conclusion is that Member States are still exercising resistance 
when it comes to shifting powers to the EU level, despite the significant 
development and progress in the communitarisation process. A glance at the 
operational decision-making process makes this evident, according to 
Carrera, who stresses the fact that the Member States are under no 
obligation to collaborate by providing technical equipment, a main 
condition for successful joint operations.122  
The politicized nature of Frontex has been considered by different authors to 
have a negative effect on the efficiency of the agency. In addition, it also 
affects the trust in Frontex, while the situation in that case contravene with 
the perception of Frontex as a depoliticised, purely technical and 
independent regulatory agency. Notwithstanding this, the politicisation can 
be understood as a natural corollary to the fact that the border management 
represents a highly political and thereto a politically sensitive area. It would 
be incorrect to render the operational coordination as a value-neutral and 
purely technical task when it includes setting political priorities and 
deploying limited resources.123 The choice of an agency, as part of the focus 
on operational cooperation within AFSJ, can thus be criticized for not 
acknowledging the political nature of the cooperation or for screening it as 
non-political.124 However, the labelling of Frontex and their mandate as 
technical may contribute to a common position between Member States and 
also work as a blame-shifter from Member States to Frontex.125  
The 2011 amendments, as a continuation of the RABIT Regulation, can be 
argued to denote a more balanced and pluralistic authority setting between 
the EU institutions and the Member States in comparison with the founding 
regulation. This is an evidence of a certain degree of trust, achieved through 
the experience of operational cooperation, as the ground for a legislative 
measure that address some of the legal shortcomings.126 The evidence would 
be the emphasis of human and fundamental rights as well as a more 
independent agency in regard to technical equipment and human resources.  
The CRATE was set up as requested by the Council in October 2006 and 
envisaged by Article 7 in the Frontex Regulation. It was first intended to be 
used on a bilateral basis between Member States but could also be used in 
JOs.127 However, the Commission acknowledged, in its evaluation report in 
2008, that the participation of Member States was scarce and the record had 
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been limitedly used. This affected especially the resource-demanding 
maritime operations; moreover the EU and Member States had high 
expectations on the agency’s assistance in precisely maritime operations.128 
Notwithstanding the scarce contributions by the Member States regarding 
participation, technical equipment and the negative impact on the maritime 
operations, the Commission declared that the coordination had already 
‘proved itself the key instrument of the European Union in ensuring 
operational solidarity between Member States and channelling resources to 
the sections of the external border with the greatest needs’.129 The 
Commission recommended full exploitation of the potential of the CRATE 
mechanism. Additionally, the Commission recommended that the 
availability of resources could be strengthened if Frontex could acquire 
equipment on its own.130  
The operational capability of Frontex was certainly strengthened due to the 
amendments in 2011, in terms of availability of technical equipment. The 
new situation with a mandatory contribution to the CRATE by the Member 
States and Frontex’s new competence to lease, own or co-own (together 
with Member States) necessary equipment, helps to ensure the operability 
and efficiency of the agency.131 The mandatory contribution of border 
guards for deployment in Frontex’s JOs and pilot projects as well as their 
contribution with border guards available for secondment shall, according to 
Art 3b, be planned in annual bilateral agreements. The obligation to make 
border guards available for deployment is exempted if a Member State ‘is 
faced with an exceptional situation substantially affecting the discharge of 
national tasks’.132 Corresponding exception regarding secondment of border 
guards as national experts reads, ‘unless that would seriously affect the 
discharge of national tasks’.133 These exceptions can be regarded as 
loopholes for States reluctant to contribute both with equipment and border 
guards to the burden-sharing mechanism part of Frontex. However, when 
Wolff considers the proposed amendments, the Stockholm Programme and 
the Lisbon Treaty she states that these developments will increase the inter-
operability and operational cooperation, two elements seen as solutions to 
the problem of consistent implementation and mutual trust inherent in JHA 
policies.134  
The increased operational independency of Frontex results in a more 
efficient coordination and facilitation of operational cooperation between 
Member States, hence enhancing cooperation.  The mandatory mechanisms 
for provision of personnel and equipment should generate a greater material 
solidarity between the States. However, the practical impact is difficult to 
review since the contribution by each Member State is negotiated and 
agreed on a bilateral basis and renegotiated every year. Thus, in several 
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aspects, the 2011 amendments can be considered to be a sound response to 
the recommendations within the integration perspective. Still the views 
differ regarding if the recent developments of Frontex role, competences 
and responsibilities, really constitute or indicate an improvement of the 
integration process, in particular trust-building, solidarity and increased 
efficiency. 
According to Schout and Wolff, the amendments strengthened mainly the 
operational planning and ‘not necessarily the design of Frontex as an 
independent agency’, despite several novelties.135 The context of this 
statement is the comparison of Frontex and the previous cooperation 
structures Scifa+ and PCU, arguing that the added value of Frontex in terms 
of independency perhaps falls below the expectations. The Member States 
still have a large degree of hierarchal control over Frontex and the legal 
control has not been clarified between Frontex and Member States.136 
Compared to other policy instruments the professionalism and independence 
have not improved.137 Thus, notwithstanding the 2011 amendments 
increasing Frontex’s operational powers, the intergovernmental features of 
EU cooperation still affects the amount of power delegated to Frontex. An 
example of intergovernmental features within AFSJ is the fact that the 
Council did not endorse the Commission’s Stockholm Action Plan, 
indicating that Member States are not accepting any fundamental regime 
changes.138 Member States have been reluctant in transferring powers to 
Frontex when at the same time southern States have called for assistance in 
time of urgency at the borders.  
3.1.2 Recommendations 
Hobbing analyses the developments in the AFSJ between 2000 and 2010 
and considers challenges and achievements in the Europeanization of the 
field. As a result of his recapitulation, he brings forward some 
recommendations for the coming years regarding border management.  One 
of the main recommendations is that the intergovernmental features should 
be replaced by more ‘federal’ responsibility; this would be the right step 
towards the achievement of an effective and uniform implementation of the 
SBC attaining secure and coherent external borders.139 He acknowledges 
that although significant progress of IBM and Frontex, EU lags behind 
because of the lack of particular routine features necessary to have full 
control over the borders. Loosely connected national sections still dominate 
the overall picture of the border management and the mandatory solidarity 
still leaves room for reluctant States to escape the contribution of equipment 
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and human resources. Hobbing is also concerned over the diverging training 
and equipment standards. Finally, he concludes that mutual trust is the most 
precious element of a good working efficient order of the external border.140  
Carrera perceives the external border as a patchwork of entry points with 
disparate practices in management and makes a similar analysis as Hobbing. 
The recommendation due to this situation that challenges the efficiency of 
and mutual trust in the European Border system is improved independent 
and political accountable evaluations.141  
The concern of disparate practices at the external (patchwork) border is 
linked to a recommendation on how to make border management uniform 
and coherent, in particular the SBC application. The recommendation 
consists of a multi-layered border service with border control officers, 
border monitor officers and fundamental rights supervisors.142 
Another solution to the disparate borders is to focus on the regulatory role of 
Frontex instead of focusing merely on the operational competences. As 
mentioned before, Rijpma understands the need for a more structural 
enforcement of Frontex operational aspects. He advocates that Frontex 
should be promoted more as a regulatory agency, since this could contribute 
to a more uniform application of Union policies and to the deployment of 
border guards by the Member States. This regulatory role could be 
reinforced through inter alia Frontex’s mandate on evaluation and common 
training of border guards.143 
The logic in regard to recommendations on strengthened operational 
competences can be understood as connected to both the objectives of 
efficiency and solidarity. The operational competences and powers of 
Frontex are sometimes perceived as too narrow and restrained in regard to 
the tasks and the potential development of a common and efficient IBM. 
The restrained powers affect the efficiency of the exercised tasks of the 
agency. Thus, Frontex should be strengthened in order to achieve efficient 
migration and border management. This would also make the agency more 
independent. Both an efficient and independent agency would increase the 
trust in the agency and hence the cooperation and solidarity between 
Member States. The solidarity would be significant improved if Frontex 
would be a de-politicized agency. Solidarity increases integration or, to put 
it different, is a way to perceive integration, an objective in itself.144  
3.1.3 Implications  
The struggle between national prerogatives and Union competence is 
obvious when looking at the legislative processes and the policymaking 
regarding Frontex. The latest amendments indicates a more balanced view 
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on the development of the agency prima facie due to the co-decision 
proceeding. At the same time, it is still obvious who is in control over 
Frontex. The fundamental issues regarding power and control over the 
agency have not been clarified or re-negotiated as demonstrated by the 
operational focus. The political independence was not addressed in the 
amendments even though the operational independence was.   
As a corollary to the perception of strong operational competences as a 
precondition to an efficient and independent agency, further enhanced 
mandate and competences of Frontex operational role could be envisaged.145 
The focus on the operational capabilities in the latest amendments has 
indeed strengthened the practical independence of Frontex, a necessary step 
for an efficient border management. Any tendency of stagnation in this 
regard cannot be found, the objective of a common Border Service is not yet 
disregarded. One has to consider that operational cooperation is the focus of 
the whole policy area as well as the entire AFSJ.146  
The parallel calls for a strengthened regulatory role of Frontex has however, 
not yet been observed. The pace and the possibility for comprehensive 
solutions to achieve an efficient agency and uniform implementation will be 
set and determined by the Member States’ will to transfer competences to 
the Union. The 2011 amendments were a step in the right direction but the 
legal implications of the remaining competence struggle, together with the 
uncertainties in how to achieve a sufficient IBM, would be the lack of 
comprehensive and depoliticized solutions or proposals and a continuation 
of a pragmatic policy approach. In other words, Frontex can still be 
described as experimentalist governance moving between independence and 
dependence of Member States even though the legal framework has been 
gradually clarified.  
The Commission and Parliaments attempts to create a more integrated 
agency and IBM, that is supranational solution, have hitherto encountered 
the miscellany views of reluctant Member States. The agency will remain in 
the hands of the Member States and can only slowly begin to become more 
supranational conceiving the objective of a common European Border 
Guard.  
3.1.4 Analysis: National Prerogatives  
Considering the hybrid authority of Frontex147 and the unclear methods of 
achieving an effective IBM and the Member States’ different opinions and 
traditions in regard to border management, the experimental model of 
governance has been an alternative approach to integration of borders and 
migration through Frontex. The intergovernmental features of Frontex have 
allowed the Member States to safeguard their traditional national 
prerogatives. However, experimentalist governance often applies to 
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operational independent units while Frontex is rather dependent on Member 
States. This was addressed in the amendments which increased the 
rapprochement between Member States.148   
The perceived effect of the Europeanization of AFSJ in terms of more 
Member State control because of an increased overview of retained 
respectively shared competences is, in my regard, an illusion in this still 
rather cluttered policy field.149 The remained confusion is due to the 
ambiguous Member States in regard to the transfer of sovereignty to Union 
level. This cluttered and intertwined power division between national and 
Union level is the result of (some) Member States’ reluctance to transfer 
powers. Operational cooperation facilitated by a coordinating agency with 
several intergovernmental features has thus been a feasible way towards 
increased cooperation, solidarity mechanisms and an attempt to streamline 
and harmonize border management; that is towards European integration. 
Considering this, the experimentalist governance of Frontex satisfies the 
need for operational cooperation and the reluctance to find comprehensive 
European policy solutions. However, it fails to provide Member States with 
the control and overview of the actual transferral of powers to Union 
level.150 Perhaps this situation, with lack of overview and control for the 
Member States over the power transfer, is as unfavourable for their 
prerogatives as the perceived situation of a comprehensive European policy 
solution.  
Considering the impossibility to reach consensus in detailed and clear 
policy-making and the fact that a traditional legislative procedure more 
easily trigger Member States’ concerns over sovereignty than other forms of 
policy cooperation, it is logically that the common policy field has not yet 
been pushed forward in regard to IBM to the extent the Commission might 
have hoped for.151 Another rationale is the uncertainty among Member 
States and EU institutions on how to achieve an IBM.152 Thus, the 
integration has taken another path. This equal with less direct 
supranationalism, as normally within AFSJ, but not necessarily with 
corresponding lack of integration. The main integration features of the role 
of Frontex are firstly, notwithstanding the intergovernmental features, about 
increasing the potential for uniform application of Union legislation and 
policies, Secondly the role of Frontex could also be envisaged to strengthen 
the Union input into initial phases of policy making processes.153 The 
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intergovernmental hierarchal control over Frontex hampers this process but 
still, the current and future influence on policy-making by Frontex cannot be 
underestimated, in particular considering the redefinition of national 
problems to common Union problems.154   
3.2 From a Democratic Perspective 
Transparency and accountability have often been considered as a two-folded 
key element of democratic control over executive bodies to prevent the 
abuse of powers. In addition, these qualities are understood as pre-
conditions attaining public trust in political authorities and equals with the 
perception of a Western democracy.155   
The institutional balance within the Union and the structures of 
accountability are coupled with the democratic legitimacy of the Union or 
the lack thereof. In this aspect the democratic perspective encounter the 
need for legitimacy in the integration perspective. The EP has been known 
as the locus of the democratic deficit since the Rome Treaty but has 
gradually increased its role and powers in the legislative process.156 
However, does this imply a corresponding capacity to hold the executives 
democratically accountable?  
Another rationale for review of Frontex, in terms of democratic concerns, is 
the deficient scrutiny of fundamental rights-sensitive activities as well as 
democratic accountability for alleged human rights violations, especially 
since Frontex is dealing with both migration and security issues.157 
3.2.1 Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy 
Frontex is a first pillar agency but notwithstanding this, the Member States 
are in the driver’s seat. Frontex is also a hybrid in regard to the 
accountability structures.158 After a comparison of Europol and Frontex the 
derived conclusion is that the most appropriate way to ensure accountability 
in the rapid evolving supranationalization of AFSJ agencies is to give full 
control to the EP and the ECJ. National parliamentary scrutiny should hence 
be secondary.159 
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The institutional setting within the Union is the first and foremost important 
factor in evaluating the democracy situation. The Frontex Regulation is a 
development of the Schengen acquis which covered different policy areas 
both in the first pillar and third pillar.160 Even though the Treaty of 
Amsterdam implied a transfer to co-decision on most immigration and 
border issues (after the transitional periods of five years) and that Frontex is 
a first pillar agency there were several legislative procedures within the field 
of immigration and borders with more or less participation of the 
Parliament.161 In continuation, the merge of the old pillars entailed further 
extension of the shared Union competence162 and a strengthened co-decision 
role for the Parliament, inter alia in the ‘Frontex areas’: integrated border 
management and persons crossing the external border, ie Art 77.2 (b) and 
(d) TFEU, the legal basis for the Frontex Regulation.163 The first co-
decision regulation adopted was the SBC and thereafter the RABIT 
Regulation and the 2011 amendments to the Frontex Regulation. However, 
Art 74 TFEU is also used as legal basis for the founding regulation, 
stipulating that the Council shall adopt measures ensuring administrative 
cooperation between Member States authorities and between these 
authorities and the Commission after consulting the Parliament.164 These 
measures shall be adopted on a proposal of the Commission or on the 
initiative of a quarter of the States, according to Art 76 TFEU. As founded 
on both articles the ambiguous role of the EP is not unexpected.  
The delegation of powers to Frontex as an independent agency and their 
exercise of mandate, competences and tasks can be analysed through the 
theory of experimentalist governance.165 Experimentalist governance is 
relevant in policy fields with heterogeneous interests, legal traditions and 
ideas. The used governance can be described as encompassing four key 
elements. The first element is the establishment of generally expressed 
framework objectives and secondly, the power of low-level units, like 
agencies, to reach these objectives. The third is the obligation to report on 
their performance as well as take part of peer-review processes regularly 
and lastly the periodic revision of their operational framework.166 
Considering this, Pollack and Slominski argue that Frontex work can be 
accommodated in the experimentalist governance but fails in meeting the 
requirements for accountability including democratic accountability.167 The 
experimental feature depends on the ‘ambivalent environment mainly 
characterised by weak political leadership’ in which Frontex operates, which 
can be explained by abovementioned heterogeneous preconditions, interests, 
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ideas and legal traditions in the Member States.168 
Evidential of this ambivalent environment is the vague Frontex Regulation 
mirroring the need to accommodate diverse national views of Frontex role. 
The labelling of Frontex as an agency concerned with management of 
operational cooperation, without a definition on management, creates a 
propensity to draw a conclusion that it is a thin line between managing 
operational cooperation than being operational.169  
This was exacerbated with the 2011 amendments increasing the agency’s 
operational role. Although the co-decision procedure has strengthened the 
Parliaments role since the 1 of January 2005, there are many operational 
aspects not covered in secondary law. In addition, considering the 
experimental nature of Frontex governance there is a whole array of issues 
not covered or clarified by secondary law and hence not subject to 
parliamentary regulatory power or to parliamentary scrutiny of the actual 
practices of Frontex.170 An example of this would be exercised intercepting 
measures at sea, which are scarcely clarified in the Frontex Regulation, the 
SBC and the Frontex Sea Border Rule. 
The role of the Parliament is instead merely concerned with the budget and 
as Frontex is almost entirely funded by the Union it has significant 
budgetary power together with the Council.171 In regard to the appointment 
of an Executive Director the Parliament has little to say. It can only, when 
already at office, invite the Director to hearings. According to Art 25.2 
Frontex Regulation, the Parliament or the Council may invite the Executive 
Director to report on the exercise of his or hers tasks. When the Council 
consulted the Parliament during the legislative process, the latter amended 
the provision from ‘may’ to ‘shall’. The justification of this amendment was 
the fact that the Parliament found it fundamental that it exercised scrutiny 
‘as of right, and not simply as an option’.172 The amendment was not 
considered in the final draft but in the view of some parliamentarians this 
does not seem to be a problem anymore because even though Frontex 
representatives initially did not show up when invited, they now do because 
of the budgetary authority of the Parliament and the need for them to present 
their programmes.173 This becomes significant when considering the 
increased budget of Frontex from the first operational years up to today.174  
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The Management Board shall forward both a General Report on the 
undertaken activities during the previous year as well as a work programme 
for the coming year.175 The 2011 amendments revised Article 25.2 and 
added that the EP may, in particular, invite the Executive Director to report 
on the implementation and monitoring of the Fundamental Rights Strategy, 
the General Report of the previous year and the work programme for the 
coming year. The new fundamental rights structure within the agency, 
especially the Fundamental Rights Strategy, provides the Parliament, the 
‘traditional fundamental rights champion in the EU’176, with a tool for 
scrutinizing and putting pressure on the agency and their practice from a 
fundamental rights perspective. The actual degree of detailed information on 
specific operations and practices possessed by the Executive Director is 
however uncertain, particularly since the operations are organized by 
Frontex but performed under the authority of the host State.177 Otherwise, 
the Parliament is excluded from scrutinizing the Executive Director, which 
only answers before the Management Board.178     
Indirect democratic control by the national parliaments concerns two groups 
of people: deployed or seconded border guards and board members 
representing a Member State. Board members and border guards can be held 
accountable by a national minister who in turn is accountable before the 
national parliament; in specific cases the board member is the national 
minister. Frontex is however not obliged to inform or report to national 
parliaments and due to lack of information national parliaments rarely 
scrutinize ministers or officials involved in EU affairs.179  
There is not any form of democratic control or scrutiny of the operational 
activities of the agency, especially not the extraterritorial implications or the 
proportionality of operational plans. Nor is there any mechanism for 
scrutiny of the risk analyses, which should be closely scrutinized while they 
are justifying the operations and constitute the instrument upon which the 
operations are planned and conducted.180  
Before Frontex led JOs like Hera181 can take place, it is the responsibility of 
the host State to conclude a bilateral agreement with relevant third countries. 
In this particular case the requirements of Senegal in the negotiations were 
unexpectedly demanding and the whole operation got delayed. The political 
sensitive content of these bilateral agreements justify that they always are 
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highly secret and never come under the scrutiny of the EP or even national 
parliaments, since they often take the form of an Memorandum of 
Understandings.182  
Thus, the Parliament is excluded to receive the risk analyses, which on the 
other hand are forwarded to the Commission and the Council.183 The 
absence of parliamentary scrutiny of risk analyses and operational plans is 
aggravated, due to the vague legal framework regarding detailed practice for 
deployed and seconded border guards, but also regarding the more 
overarching issues eg, jurisdiction, applicable laws, what is considered a 
safe place and which actor would be responsible for potential claims for 
asylum in different sorts of operations. The implications of a managerial 
body of the Union should be subject to democratic control and the agency 
itself, ie the Executive Director and the Management Board, should be 
accountable before the Parliament. The characteristics of Frontex praxis, 
namely their intelligence-driven operations and the use of risk analyses as 
determining and guiding all operational activity, result in secrecy, lack of 
transparency and hence also lack of democratic accountability in regard to 
the operations.184   
3.2.2 Recommendations  
For the sake of democratic accountability and the rule of law, Carrera argues 
that the source legitimizing and founding the operations and activities of 
Frontex have to be subject to ‘a comprehensive assessment, review and 
accountability which would greatly benefit from a more direct involvement 
of the EP.185 Before moving ahead with the European integration this 
vulnerability must be addressed in regard to both the institutional and 
substantial mechanisms of IBM, notwithstanding this democratic 
accountability cannot be ensured in IBM and in particular in the activities of 
Frontex.186  
The 2011 amendments is not capable of completely addressing the dilemma 
of lack of democratic scrutiny, more measures are needed to fully achieve a 
high democratic standard on transparency and accountability.187 
A category of monitoring border guards set up under a new body within the 
EP was a part of the comprehensive recommendation of a Common 
European Border Service made by Carrera in 2010, glancing at the proposal 
for the 2010 amendments.188 These would initiate disciplinary measures 
against border guards for impropriate or disproportionate behaviour in the 
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application of SBC and work as an intermediary between individuals 
presenting complaints or appeals and the national authority as well as report 
of budgetary and proportionality issues to the Parliament. The added value 
would inter alia be a more accountable legitimate and proportionate IBM as 
well as a reinforced role of the Parliament.189 
Considering that the preconditions for democratic control are openness and 
transparency, the EP should have access to all documents related to Frontex 
activities and operations, especially since Frontex was established as an 
agency to improve transparency and is subject to the rules related to 
communication of documents and information.190 The Parliament needs to 
get access to the follow up of Frontex activities as well as the risk analyses 
otherwise the border management activities evade democratic scrutiny to a 
large extent.191 In conclusion a proper democratic control should be ensured 
as the activities of Frontex is connected to the exercise of public authority 
and fundamental rights and freedoms.192 
3.2.3 Implications 
The legal implications of the recommendation would be amending the 
Frontex Regulation by inserting obligations for Frontex to forward risk 
analyses and threat assessments to the EP to the same extent as to the 
Commission and Council and submit other relevant operational documents 
on the initiative of the Parliament. In practice this could be expressed, inter 
alia through amending the current Art 4 of the amended Frontex Regulation 
regarding risk analyses and Art 11 about information exchange.  
Carrera envisages that the monitoring mechanism under the Parliament 
would facilitate depoliticisation and accountability of border control activity 
as well as improve legitimacy of the EU immigration and border policy. He 
argues that Art 77.2 (d) Lisbon Treaty provides a legal basis for the 
Parliament and the Council to adopt new creative solutions to develop 
policies for a gradual implementation of IBM and that his recommendation 
therefore would be possible and legally accommodated by the Treaty.193 
This would indeed reinforce the position of the Parliament and constitute a 
significant shift in the control functions over the agency. This would entail a 
transferral of national prerogatives as perceived by most Member States. 
However, the counterargument is that the Union already has exercised 
competence in regard to the establishment of Frontex, at least considering 
the amendment of the regulation as subject to the co-decision procedure, and 
hence in prolongation of this, may exercise democratic control on Union 
level. 
                                                
189 ibid. 
190 Frontex Regulation, supra note 4, Art 28; Jorry (2007), supra note 88, 21. 
191 ibid, 26-27 
192 ibid, 21. 
193 ibid. 
 37 
3.2.4 Analysis: Parliamental Assurances 
In the context of the establishment of Frontex, the EP was weak because of 
the consultation procedure and consequently, the Council did not consider 
its amendments in the final text. The result is a point of departure where the 
control mechanism lays firmly in the hands of the main stakeholders, the 
Member States.194 Even though the role of the Parliament has been 
considerably reinforced since then, it now participates in the legislative 
process together with the Council and got a strengthened role with the 2011 
amendments, the democratic control over Frontex activities is still weak.  
Despite the fact that Frontex is a first pillar agency it is possible to argue 
that it is more similar to ‘third pillar’ agencies like Eurojust and Europol 
considering coordination of operations, executive powers and information 
exchange.195 This would also cohere to the scarce control activities outside 
the hands of the Member States.  
The creation of a set of independent (from Frontex) monitoring border 
guards is part of an ambitious multi-layered border service addressing 
problems with uniform application, fundamental rights compliance and 
accountability and transparency. In my opinion it would not be the legal 
base that would hamper the creative idea of a set of both controlling border 
guards as well as monitoring border guards. Instead it would be the 
unlikelihood of an agreement between the Member States of such a 
sovereignty intruding proposal, especially since it, in its comprehensive 
approach, involve a new institutional mechanism under the Parliament as 
well as a new monitoring and evaluating mandate for FRA. On the other 
hand there are some features of this recommendation accommodated in the 
2011 amendments, such as the involvement of FRA in the Consultative 
Forum as well as the Fundamental Rights Strategy as an improved tool for 
scrutinizing fundamental rights implications when hearing the Executive 
Director. However, these improvements are weak in comparison to the 
deficiencies raised by scholars. The amendments contribute with little in 
regard to democratic control and instead focused on the operational 
capabilities of Frontex and its operational independence. In contrary, this 
could exacerbate the lack of democratic control over operational activities as 
the competences were reinforced by the amendments, excluding national 
parliaments from a potential (at least in theory) scrutiny.   
The call for a strengthened role of the Parliament in regard to access to 
documents, risk assessments, operational plans, reports and evaluations is, 
according to me, a necessary evolution of the legal framework surrounding 
Frontex. Technically the legislative creation would not be a challenge in 
comparison to the multi-layered border service but this is also a difficult 
agreement to conclude between the Member States and a power transfer 
hard to imagine. However, increased access to the activities and operations 
of Frontex should be ensured by an obligation for Frontex to forward risk 
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assessments to the EP as it is obligated to do to the Commission and the 
Council and right of the Parliament to request operational plans.196 
Increased democratic scrutiny is essential for the legitimacy of the agency 
and the image of the Union as an advocate for democracy.  
3.3 Human Rights Perspective 
The human rights (HR) perspective is overall a critical perspective with 
focus on the deficiencies in the respect and fulfilment of refugee and human 
rights. The perspective put forward several issues in the review of Frontex, 
of which many concern the extraterritorial application of border 
management and how the measures and operations affect the safeguards for 
human and fundamental rights. Extraterritorialisation (sometimes called 
externalisation, outsourcing, remote control or subcontracting) 
accommodates both the physical relocation of border controls and the 
sharing or shift of responsibilities for border management to third States.197 
Extraterritorialisation is not a result of the work of Frontex but is a corollary 
to the emphasis on pre-border surveillance and cooperation with third 
countries in migration policies as part of the emerged notion of integrated 
border management, of which Frontex also is an essential part. These are 
perceived as necessary tools to achieve an efficient border management, that 
is migration control, by the European institutions. The proliferation of the 
externalisation has emerged parallel to the development of the agency, 
which also lists third country cooperation as an important aspect in fulfilling 
its mandate.198 The extraterritorialisation and Frontex can be understood as 
mutually supportive notions, part of each other’s development. 
The externalisation of border control measures rises the question to what 
extent migrants subject to extraterritorial pre-border control measures can 
rely on the same safeguards applicable to regular border control 
measures.199 This question has been the overarching concern for the HR 
perspective resulting in proposals on how to govern the external dimension 
in Union law so as to prevent or remedy the gap between legal safeguards 
and corresponding responsibilities and performed border surveillance.200 
Accompanying legal safeguards are perceived as a necessary corollary to the 
promotion of and emphasis on the externalisation of the border and 
migration control of the Union.  
In addition, the responsibility for violations of human rights are very 
difficult to attribute to one specific actor when there is a range of multi-
                                                
196 cf Frontex Amendment 2011, supra note 17, Art 4. 
197 M den Heijer, ’Europe beyond its Borders: Refugee and Human Rights Protection in 
Extraterriotorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges’ in B Ryan and V Mitsilegas (eds) 
Extraterritorial Immigration Control (Martinius Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2010) 190-191 
[den Heijer (2010)]. 
198 Frontex website, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/about/mission-and-tasks accessed 15 
March 2013. 
199 den Heijer (2010), supra note 197, 170. 
200 ibid. 
 39 
layered authorities involved in operations coordinated by Frontex.201 This 
affects the access to effective legal remedy and the justiciability of 
individual’s rights, a precondition in ensuring and enforcing the 
implementation of all rights.  
Frontex maritime operations in the Mediterranean and in the territory of 
third Sates in Africa have attracted most attention within the human rights 
society, even if Frontex also conducts land and air operations. The praxis of 
diverting boats with migrants back to the state of departure (origin or 
transit) has resulted in concerns regarding non-refoulement, access to 
asylum and access to legal remedies.202  
Frontex’s role as a coordinator in joint operations, in which Member States 
with contested practices of push-back measures participate, has contributed 
to Frontex’s reputation as a highly criticized agency from human rights 
perspectives. In particular, since the countries questioned by human rights 
scholars and NGOs often functions as the host State for extraterritorial 
operations led by Frontex.203 One of the main challenges for these Member 
States with maritime borders are the fact that boat migrants usually travel in 
mixed flows, ie persons with protection needs and with intent to seek 
asylum, travel in the same boat as irregular migrants with no need of 
protection, not intending to seek asylum.204 
The human rights perspective identifies the role and responsibilities of 
Frontex in the context of individual rights and with the objective that these 
rights shall be enforceable in a court so as to provide as much practical 
value as possible. This requires, besides clear material rights, a responsible 
actor and liability of that actor before a court. It also requires monitoring 
mechanisms and transparency, in order for the actual scrutiny of Frontex to 
become implemented in reality. This is the context in which the review of 
Frontex’s role and responsibilities are set in the human rights perspective. It 
is envisioned from the eyes of an individual boat migrant trying to reach 
Europe.  
The scope of this human rights perspective is thus not the material 
allegations or evidence of shortage in Frontex’s respect for refugee and 
human rights or lack of safeguards regarding these. Enumerations of several 
aspects of Frontex’s work, especially in extraterritorial immigration 
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controls, at odds with human rights has already been covered by the 
academia and civil society (in terms of specialised NGOs) and is only to be 
mentioned shortly in this endeavour.205 Instead, the focus is on the legal 
accountability of Frontex, including an examination of the mandate and 
legal competences versus practices, since these concepts are the basis for 
establishing and distinguishing responsibility. The multiple allegations of 
human rights violations are brought forward in vain if the role and legal 
responsibilities of the involved actors are blurred. The blurred mandate, 
competences and corresponding responsibilities can therefore be argued to 
create a rights-related accountability gap, which means that individuals are 
left without access to an effective legal remedy.206 The perceived shortage 
and the proposed changes within the HR perspective are based on diverse 
understandings of the unclear role of Frontex. 
3.3.1 Hybrid Competences and Tasks 
Frontex is often presented as a technical and bureaucratic agency, which is 
information driven and only mandated with coordination without effect on 
individuals.207 Despite this description some scholars claim that Frontex is 
an agency with competences that ‘transform classical understandings of the 
boundaries of ‘executive and administrative power’ in the EU AFSJ’.208 
Baldaccini notes that the responsibility of the external borders still rests 
firmly upon the Member States, according to the Frontex Regulation. She 
continues to state that notwithstanding this, Frontex’s mandate, structure 
and actual activities suggest another less clear division of responsibility.209  
Coordination of joint operations is one of the most visible ways through 
which Frontex is engaged in strengthening the operational cooperation 
between Member States. The initiative for a JO can be made through a 
request from a Member State approved by the agency or Frontex may itself 
initiate a JO in agreement with the host Member State. Frontex competence 
to initiate JOs was increased by the amendment 2011 where the expression 
‘and in agreement with the Member States concerned’ was deleted and 
replaced by ‘in agreement with the host Member States’.210 The wording of 
the rest of the article is also changed as to express a greater independence in 
the right to initiate JOs.  
The status of border guards of one Member State being deployed in another 
Member State was not addressed in the founding regulation. The law of the 
host State was assumed to be applicable, compare Art 10 that states the 
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same principle for Frontex staff. The RABIT Regulation addressed this and 
equated guest border guards with national border guards and gave them the 
capacity to exercise all powers for border checks and surveillance in 
accordance with SBC.211  
The carrying of weapon and use of force is also addressed specifically. The 
conditions for carrying service weapon are laid down in the national law of 
the host State. Use of force requires the consent of both the host and the 
home Member State, the presence of border guards of the host State and 
shall be exercised in compliance with the law of the host State.212  
When exercising their powers, guest border guards have to comply with 
Union law and the law of the host State. The latest amendment added a 
reference to International law and fundamental rights as well.213   
The scope of Frontex role and activities during JOs is often considered 
unclear. Which also implies that the ‘demarcation of responsibility between 
Member States and the Agency in operational activities’ also becomes 
unclear.214 One reason is the dual nature of organisational activities and 
semi-operational activities within the mandate of Frontex.215 Baldaccini 
continues to demonstrate the contradictions by pointing at the task to carry 
out risk analysis, which prima facie is an ordinary agency task based on 
information. However, Baldaccini argues that in practice, operations are 
planned and initiated on the basis of Frontex’s risk analysis, which means 
that Frontex initiates the operation and then controls the planning and 
coordinates the actual implementation. This implies that only a fine line 
distinguishes the managerial and operational (executive) role. In addition, 
according to the regulation, the measures undertaken outside Frontex 
coordination have to complement and supplement its activities. Altogether, 
Baldaccini understands this as a significant shift in the responsibility over 
the external borders. Parallel, the agency stresses the importance of Member 
State responsibility and the fact that one rather small Union body cannot 
replace 27 Member States’ border authorities but are only there to 
coordinate operational cooperation. Notwithstanding this, Baldaccini 
suggests that the responsibilities of Frontex arise from its role as planner 
and coordinator and not as the executer.216  
Another rationale for uncertainties, regarding the operational role of 
Frontex, is the lack of legal definition of a JO in the Frontex Regulation and 
the absence of provisions governing how operations should be prepared and 
conducted.217 However, the amendment inserted new detailed provisions 
regarding what issues the operational plan must govern and how these shall 
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be decided.218 According to this provision, the operational plan must govern 
eg modus operandi, command and control provisions as well as tasks and 
instructions for guest officers. The plan is drafted by the Executive Director, 
in close cooperation with the participating States, in particular with the host 
State, and functions as an outline for the whole operation.219  
The practice of push-back measures, such as interception of boat migrants to 
stop or deter them from entering European territory, has led joint operations 
into international waters and territorial waters of third States. 
Approximately two-thirds of Frontex expenditure is taken up by sea 
operations.220 The Frontex Sea Border Rule contains binding preconditions 
for interception of boats in international waters or other measures aiming at 
pushing back migrants without prejudice to international protection 
obligations.221 However, how the actual implementation of the interception 
provisions shall be performed to comply with fundamental and human 
rights, is not completely clarified in the rule. Art 14.1 in the amended 
Frontex Regulation, states that operations taking place in the territory of a 
third State shall at least comply with Union norms and standards. There is 
also a requirement for the operational plan to specify legislation, 
jurisdiction, and geographical area and to refer to International and Union 
law regarding interception, disembarkation and rescue at sea.222 According 
to Frontex’s Code of Conduct, all participating actors must comply with 
International law, European Union law, the national law of both home and 
host Member States and respect and promote fundamental rights in 
accordance with all relevant international and European instruments.223 All 
participants must also:  
promote, in full compliance with the principle of non refoulement, that 
persons seeking international protection are recognised, receive 
adequate assistance, are informed, in an appropriate way, about their 
rights and relevant procedures and are referred to national authorities 
responsible for receiving their asylum requests.224 
The Fundamental Rights Strategy declares that Frontex shall take into 
consideration the special situation of persons seeking international 
protection as well as assess the implications on fundamental rights when 
proposing or preparing JOs.225 
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Frontex may enter into working agreements with authorities of third States 
(usually law enforcement authorities responsible for operational border 
control) but lacks the competence to conclude bilateral agreements with 
third countries to allow joint operations on their territory. 226 These 
extraterritorial JOs are instead built on bilateral arrangements concluded 
between participating Member States and third States. Provisions about the 
role and competence of Frontex, especially executive powers of the teams 
deployed by Frontex, may be included in a bilateral agreement, according to 
Art 14.4 of the Frontex Amendment 2011. This implies that the role of 
Frontex and corresponding executive powers of the teams deployed by the 
agency will be decided on an ad-hoc basis in some JOs.  
In the context of maritime operations, an International Coordination Centre 
(ICC) is established in the host-State with an officer from the host-State in 
charge of the ICC. That coordinator officer is also head of the Joint 
Coordinator Board (JCB), a board comprised of one national officer from 
each participating State, Frontex experts and a risk analyst. The ICC 
implements the operational decisions of the JCB. This can be argued to 
imply that the control of the assets participating in the operation is in the 
hands of the Member States through the national officers in the JCB, who 
have the possibility to consult their superiors before giving directions. 
Rijpma continues to conclude that the tactical command is in the hands of 
each specific unit or vessel or as directed by the national officers in the 
JCB.227  Another evident of the host State command is that the Frontex 
Coordinating Officer (FCO) may, in all Frontex operations, communicate 
the view of the agency to the host State when the latter instructs the 
European Border Guard Teams.228 The host State shall take the view of the 
agency into consideration but are not obligated to comply with it.  
The fact that both the operational plan and bilateral agreements governs 
fundamental issues about jurisdiction, legislation and division of powers 
between the participants exacerbates the vague contours of Frontex role, 
competences and responsibilities, since these documents are not made 
public. Despite Rijpmas clear view on operational control, contentions about 
the exact scope of Frontex’s coordinating role still exists, one reason being 
the shifting role of Frontex in different operations. Baldaccini states that:  
The lack of clarity and transparency regarding the exact scope of 
Frontex’s coordinating role, and the way in which Frontex operations 
are conducted make it difficult to establish which authority can 
ultimately be held responsible by an individual.229  
Frontex initiative of, or involvement in, JOs based on bilateral agreements 
in third States has, in addition, been highly criticized in regard to the fact 
that these bilateral arrangements often are concluded through non-public 
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memorandum of understandings and therefore lacks transparency and 
democratic control.230 The risk brought forward is that Frontex cooperates 
with and undertakes JOs in third States that do not respect refugee and 
human rights.231  Frontex involvement in these operations taking place in 
third States was without a legal framework until the amendments in 2011. 
Since 2011 a new paragraph has been inserted stating that when Frontex 
cooperates with third States on their territory, it has to comply with norms 
and standards at least equivalent to Union legislation.232 This rather 
imprecise provision is the only legal framework for activities in territories of 
third States.  
Another of Frontex operational tasks expressed in the founding regulation 
was to assist Member States in Joint Return Operations (JRO), eg through 
identifying best practices on the acquisition of travel documents and 
removal of illegally present third-country nationals (TCN).233 The 
Commission observed that Frontex had engaged in more than assistance in 
JRO and instead exercised a coordinating role successfully. Hence, the 
Commission acknowledged a mismatch between the legal basis and Frontex 
actual activities, which resulted in a proposal of a reinforced article 
concerning Frontex mandate and competence in JROs.234 As a result, the 
Frontex Amendment 2011 states that Frontex shall provide necessary 
assistance and ensure coordination or organisation. In the end of the 
paragraph, the financial support is made conditional upon Member States’ 
full respect for the ChFR.235 The Commission observed, in its Impact 
Assessment, that the Member States called for even stronger support from 
Frontex, if this implies further increased competences to be expected in new 
amendments remains to be seen.236   
A provision stating that the first evaluation following the entry into force of 
the amendment shall include an evaluation of the need of increased 
coordination, that is increased competences, and the feasibility of the 
creation of a European system of border Guards. A clear demonstration of 
the fact that the objective of a European Border Guard has not been 
abandoned; instead one can envisage more operational competences being 
transferred to Frontex. 
3.3.2 Legal Accountability lex lata  
As discussed above,237 there is a widespread view according to which 
Frontex and similar agencies are not ‘operational’ in the sense that they are 
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taking decisions and exercise executive powers that result in responsibilities 
regarding fundamental rights violations.238 Their facilitating and 
coordinating role do not, according to this view, amount to an operational 
responsibility, instead the responsibility rests exclusively with the Member 
States. This implies that international and European human and fundamental 
rights obligations fall upon the Member States and not Frontex.239 
Baldaccini continues to note that even though the Member States cannot 
avoid their responsibility, there is not enough information given by Frontex 
or the Member States ensuring that the participating States comply with all 
obligations under human rights and refugee law. At the opposite there are 
many concerns about practices used by countries as Spain, Italy and 
Greece.240 Even though Frontex awareness of fundamental rights has been 
increased, it is still impossible to monitor the situation where migrants 
encounter border guards in different push-back measures at sea.241 
The legal accountability builds upon the contested assumption of an agency 
not in contact with, and whose actions do not give legal effect to, 
individuals. The national border guards instead perform these tasks. 
The host State is liable for the conduct of deployed border guards, according 
to national law of the host State. Only if the conduct is caused by gross 
negliance the host State may approach the home State with claims of 
reimbursement.242 Regarding criminal liability, the border guards shall be 
treated, according to national law, as if they were national border guards of 
the host State.243 These rules govern the relation between Member States in 
case of claims for damages or criminal offenses; they do not particularly 
address human rights claims.244 Outside this context, general rules on 
attributability govern the imputability of border guards participating in 
operations. Due to the operational structure laid down in the Frontex 
Regulation, actions seems to be attributable to the host State at whose 
disposal the guest officers are placed.245 The applicant would thus bring a 
claim against the responsible national authority in the national court.  
The practical implementations of this statement is however not as clear as 
theory. The questions remain how this accountability is ensured during 
complicated joint operations with multi-layered actors scattered in inter alia 
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a significant area of international waters and territorial waters.246 The actual 
availability to a legal remedy depends thus on the degree of commitment of 
the host State to good administration and compliance to the safeguards in 
the Union policies regarding asylum, migration and border control. 
However, den Heijer does not exclude a certain positive obligation of the 
home Member States in refraining from participating with border guards in 
doubtful operations and practices.247 In addition to the national level, the 
ECtHR contributes as a last resort when national remedies have been 
exhausted or have not been available.248  
Regarding the accountability of Frontex as a Union agency, ECJ can review 
the legality of acts of European bodies and agencies on the initiative of a 
natural or legal person but only if the act produces legal effect vis-à-vis the 
applicant.249 There is no exhaustive list on what can constitute an act with 
legal effect but the ECJ ruled that the form is immaterial as long as it brings 
about a distinct change in the legal position of the applicant.250 However, 
due to the coordinating and organisational role of Frontex the practical 
possibility for an individual migrant to show that a Frontex act or measure 
has produced legal effect for him or her is rather low. The requisite requires 
that the act leave no discretion to the Member States in their implementation 
but instead directly concern the applicant.  
According to Guild et al, it is not impossible that ECJ might denote actions 
of agencies, such as operational plans, as acts producing legal effect, 
keeping in mind the Court’s flexible approach in previous case law. In 
particular if the document is expressed in an imperative way and affects 
Charter rights of an individual. The more Frontex operational capabilities 
are increased the more likely it gets that Frontex actions qualify as a legal 
effect-producing act.251 Rijpma notes that an operational plan constituting 
modus operandi for an operation could, at least in theory, be challenged 
with Article 263 TFEU as basis. Notwithstanding the fact that the Article 
envisages actions and measures by agencies with decision-making powers, 
something Frontex lacks.252  
One way of addressing indirect accountability for Frontex in a national court 
is through the preliminary reference procedure in Article 267 TFEU. The 
applicant would bring a claim against a national authority before the 
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national court. To the extent the relevant event was connected to Frontex, 
the court could submit a question to ECJ about the interpretation of eg the 
operational plan or other instructions from Frontex. The applicant would 
still be subject to the discretion of the Member State in whether the court 
would choose to submit a question to ECJ or not.253  
Another possible procedure in order to seek redress before ECJ, is the 
compensation for damage procedure in Article 340 TFEU. The Union shall 
compensate damage caused by its institutions or its servants. In the Frontex 
Regulation ECJ is explicitly given jurisdiction over non-contractual liability 
of Frontex.254 Even though Article 340 does not mention agencies, Frontex 
staff could be accommodated by the expression of Union’s servants.255 
In order to succeed with a claim, one has to show a sufficiently serious 
breach of an obligation and a ‘direct causal link between the breach of the 
obligation resting on the author of the act and the damage sustained by the 
injured parties’.256 The difficulties in showing that the action of the agency 
is causal to the damage of the individual remain as in the annulment 
procedure.  
3.3.3 Policy Recommendations 
The Stockholm Programme warrants a further expansion of Frontex’s 
mandate and denotes a direction towards a European Corps of Border 
Guards, notwithstanding an explicit expression making it a long-term 
goal.257 This direction is implemented in the amendment’s enhanced 
mandate and competences of Frontex and in the explicit request of an 
evaluation of the feasibility of establishing a European system of border 
guards.258  
Regarding fundamental rights, Carrera stresses several issues of contention 
relevant for Frontex operations and activity: their effect on the principle of 
non-refoulement, human dignity, access to asylum, the lack of clear rules of 
engagement for joint operations and the disembarkation of rescued persons 
at sea and finally, the lack of evidence concerning practical implementation 
of the guarantees in the SBC and the tensions of Frontex’s activities with the 
non-discrimination principle.259 
Guild et al argue that by putting the technocratic label on Frontex, 
discussions about fundamental rights violation are avoided and an attempt to 
depoliticize the agency to avoid legal, democratic and public accountability 
are made. They bring forward a view which implies that Frontex’s initiation, 
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coordination and supervision of joint border control operations, especially 
push-back operations at sea, creates legal effects for the status and 
fundamental rights of persons on the move. The authors continue to suggest 
that this situation is not at odds with the statement in Art 1.2, a mostly 
political provision that demonstrates the sensitiveness of the area and raises 
questions about definitions of executive and coercive powers. 
Notwithstanding this, the legal effects and responsibilities for fundamental 
rights violations remain in the scope of Frontex’s activities. In line with the 
previous, Guild et al proposes that the concept management describes the 
role of Frontex more accurate than facilitator or coordinator as it reveals the 
level of responsibility in case of alleged violations of International or Union 
law.260     
Carrera presents a proposal containing three levels of European border 
officials of whom one level aims at improve the compliance with 
fundamental rights.261 He recommends a set of officials functioning as 
fundamental rights supervisors established under an expanded evaluating 
mandate of the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). The officials would be 
competent to undertake evaluations and inspections on the spot with focus 
on the compliance with fundamental rights. They would assess and support 
national, regional and local authorities handling complaints about 
fundamental rights and advice in proceedings before relevant courts and 
judicial bodies. The competence of these officials would be ensuring that 
the remedies and guarantees of SBC were made effective together with 
another set of officials, the border monitor officials. Beside this category of 
officials, he proposes a category of border control officials set up under 
Frontex and only mandated to ensure the correct application of SBC. Their 
mandate would only be within the scope of SBC and they would not hold 
any police or asylum competences. Carrera seems to limit rather than extend 
the operational competences of Frontex in this policy proposal. The added 
value would be the safeguards put in place to ensure the respect of 
fundamental rights and administrative and procedural guarantees in all 
border control activities. The recommendation also facilitates autonomy 
from national governments and accountability of border practices.262 
Rijpma also expresses a restrained view on the call for an enhanced 
operational role of Frontex and calls for a more structured development of 
Frontex in the future. Before the entry into force of the amendment, he 
recommended a development of Frontex’s more regulatory role instead of 
its operational role. His perceived rationale is the absence of a sound 
framework for the constitutional issues regarding rights and freedoms raised 
by the operational coordination of Frontex. Conversely, he notes that the 
latest proposal focused once more on reinforcing Frontex’s operational role. 
Rijpma presents an alternative development of Frontex by focusing on 
‘facilitating improved training, exchange of information and interoperability 
of technical means, as well as a more frequent and binding evaluation of 
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member states’ implementation of the Schengen border acquis’.263 This 
could contribute to a more uniform implementation of SBC without 
requiring the deployment of national border guards in other Member 
States.264 
Baldaccini is also critical to the repeated call for an enhanced operational 
agency and recommends that Frontex’s activities must be monitored and 
scrutinized so to prevent that national authorities increase their autonomy ‘at 
the expense of political, legal and institutional constraints on policymaking’ 
in this area.265 The situation calls for the development of a proper 
framework for Frontex’s accountability including legal accountability, 
which restores the gaps in the protection of the affected individuals.266 
ECJ has ruled that where national rules fall within the scope of Union law 
these national implementing rules have to be compatible with fundamental 
rights.267 Rijpma presents this principle as a possible analogy also 
accommodating the operational activities of Member States. Another 
possible scrutiny of the Member States’ activities within the framework of 
Frontex is the procedure in Article 258 TFEU on the initiative of the 
Commission. ECJ could, in line with this provision, have a right to review 
the operational activities of Member States whether or not they participate 
in a Frontex led operation.268 
Considering the dual nature of Frontex, semi assisting and semi operational, 
Rijpma also seems to suggest that even though the coordinating activities of 
Frontex are non-binding vis-à-vis third parties and guest border guards, ie 
potential violations are impossible to attribute to Frontex, the coordination 
of Member States’ operations engaged in violations of migrants rights will 
make Frontex an accomplice. Frontex should therefore be held accountable 
for its complicity.269 As a result, Member States and the European 
institutions should be able to use Art 263 TFEU to challenge Frontex’s 
decision to participate or initiate operations or if Frontex refrains from 
terminate an operation in which questionable practices take place.270  Guild 
et al also holds the possibility of operational plans and other ‘technical’ 
documents being reviewed under Article 263 TFEU. A flexible approach 
can be envisaged towards the admissibility criteria for individuals bringing 
claims. This would not be the first time ECJ makes a dynamic interpretation 
in regard to its jurisdiction to ensure legal remedies. Guild et al refer to the 
case of Sogelma when ECJ extended its jurisdiction under current Art 263 to 
accommodate agency acts even though it was not foreseen in the Treaty.271 
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The possibility for the EP to step forward and take an active role as 
fundamental rights litigator should hence be highlighted.272 This could be an 
efficient complement to a flexible and reinforced possibility for individuals 
to bring a claim against Frontex before ECJ. Particularly, since the EU 
institutions are privileged applicants and do not need to fulfil the 
admissibility criteria laid down for natural and legal persons.273 
One could also argue that Frontex has a positive obligation to ensure that all 
participating States respect fundamental rights, especially since they are 
enshrined in the ChFR and are at the heart of the values of the Union.274 The 
corollary of not arguing for such an obligation of Frontex is that the EU will 
fund, facilitate and coordinate operations in breach of Union law and 
International law and in that way become an accomplice.275 
The stronger and more independent role of Frontex in terms of coordination 
and organisation, in particular the role of the FCO, due to the amendments 
in 2011, could facilitate Frontex’s role as a monitoring and evaluating 
agency and create the basis for establishing such liability before the ECJ.276 
The Executive Director has currently an obligation to terminate or suspend 
operations when there are serious violations of fundamental rights or if they 
are likely to persist as well as when the conditions to conduct an operation 
no longer are fulfilled.277 Elaborating this monitoring and evaluating 
mandate could also result in more legitimacy, fundamental rights sensitive 
operations and create a basis for liability. 
A more comprehensive proposal is recommending a specific mechanism 
within ECJ to deal with the challenges of the legal effects created by 
Frontex to improve access to justice and effective legal remedies for 
individuals subject to Frontex’s actions, regardless of nationality or 
location.278 This special branch of ECJ, named an ‘Agencies Tribunal’, 
would receive admissibility claims and claims of a legal and administrative 
nature against agencies like Frontex. The tribunal would apply a special 
procedure for joint liability so the claimant was relieved from the burden to 
clearly identify who, Frontex or participating Member States, has committed 
the alleged violation, leaving the burden of proof with Frontex and 
participating Member States. A new piece of secondary law regarding TCNs 
access to rights and legal remedies in situation of pre-border control, 
including extraterritorial pre-border control, should be adopted and the 
tasks, competences and allocation of responsibilities of EU Home Affairs 
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agencies should also be clarified in law. No actions falling outside the legal 
mandate should be tolerated, according to the authors.279  
The lack of information on how Frontex works and how the Member States 
implement SBC have been criticized.280 This shortage, contributes to the 
responsibility gap while it is difficult if not impossible to gather information 
about what happens when migrants encounter border guard officials in joint 
operations at sea. Thus, the accountability must be ensured through an 
independent monitoring system. Bruin proposes that independent observers 
should be present on board every vessel, deployed in extraterritorial border 
control activities, with potential interception activities.281 Guild, Gronendijk 
and Carrera recommends that an EU Border Monitor post should be 
established with two main competences: first, to ensure that EU border 
controls are consistent with Union law and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, second, to monitor the situation in which expulsions take place in 
the framework of the Return Directive.282  
In 2010, Rijpma opposed the unilateral criticism towards Frontex and 
concluded that the failure to take appropriate measures to fully respect 
international rules regarding international protection in border management, 
especially in maritime border controls, is a political decision and the focus 
of criticism should therefore be on the Member Sates and the political 
institutions of the Union and consequently not on Frontex.283 However, 
Rijpma continued to state that this did not mean that Frontex should not be 
scrutinized at all but there should be an awareness of which actors bear the 
responsibility, competence and powers to ensure the operations’ compliance 
with international protection standards, namely the Member States and the 
EU institutions not Frontex.284  
Rijpma stated that the Union should speak out against such practices of 
Member States, even if this is a very sensitive political issue. He further 
implied that even though Frontex is a weak actor it has a certain 
responsibility as a Union body and should play a role in improving the 
sensitivity towards protection issues rather than accept the practices of the 
Member States. Rijpma concluded that, if EU is committed to human rights, 
it should re-examine its cooperation with third countries questionable in a 
human rights perspective and reflect on how it can ensure the safeguards in 
the SBC also in extraterritorial activities of border control.285  
Carrera holds that the AFSJ constitutes a crucial test case for the practical 
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implementation of fundamental rights in a post-Lisbon context for ECJ. He 
continues to list some of the reasons for this challenge, namely divergences 
among Member States on Fundamental rights standards, accountability gaps 
and responsibility shifts in migration and border control measures.286 He 
recommend an increased and strengthened role of third party interveners and 
the introduction of interim relief measures after a comparison with the 
ECtHR and its long experience as human rights tribunal in Europe.287  
3.3.4 Implications 
The legal implications of the presented recommendations would involve a 
huge shift of control towards the European institutions. A strong hierarchal 
control would emerge if the legal accountability of Frontex were 
safeguarded by the scrutiny of ECJ and if Frontex was given extended 
mandate to evaluate Member States practice and capabilities. The review of 
Frontex would be in the hands of ECJ and the review of Member States 
would rest in the hands of Frontex.  
The recommendations on a more regulatory approach of Frontex instead of 
enhanced operational competences also entail a more fundamental question 
of power relations. To give Frontex mandate to evaluate the Member States’ 
ability to manage the external border efficiently and in compliance with the 
safeguards set up by Union law, in terms of international protection, non-
refoulement and other rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, is also a 
marked debate about national prerogatives. The recommendation of a 
reinforced training focus could be a feasible way of ensuring uniform 
implementation of Union policies since it does not entail competence issues. 
Some scholars promote inter alia a flexible approach to the admissibility 
criteria from the ECJ to accommodate acts of Frontex and a Parliament 
stepping up to defend fundamental rights by taking the role as a litigator. 
This could be achieved through a precedent from the court. However, in the 
context of shared competences this could be understood to exceed the 
competence of ECJ and surpass the Lisbon Treaty by the Member States. 
Rijpma’s critique of the unilateral criticism towards Frontex is interesting 
since it entails an analysis about the actors and the struggle of power and 
control. It acknowledges the possibility of holding Frontex accountable and 
steer the agency in another direction legally but the political will is missing 
due to the sensitive issue.   
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3.3.5 Analysis: Operational Capabilities and 
Legal Accontability 
Operations led by Frontex are, notwithstanding the recent increased 
operational competences of Frontex, still in the hands of the Member States, 
due to the actual exercise of border control. In other words, the 
responsibility for the external borders of the Member States still rests on the 
Member States. The reverse would be unthinkable in the current situation. 
Therefore it is important for the European institutions to acknowledge this 
and speak out against practises in breach of international and Union 
standards. Frontex can be a tool to use in this sensitive political area.  
Frontex is thus not responsible for external borders of Member States but is 
responsible for the role it is playing in the border management through its 
coordination, facilitation and organisation. The question is what 
responsibilities are incumbent upon Frontex. It is not clear what the 
managerial role accommodate and hence in what activities Frontex must 
comply with international obligations and fundamental rights. This 
confusion is the fundamental ground for the unclear demarcations of 
responsibilities and accountabilities between Member States and Frontex. 
The more operational Frontex gets the more vague the boundaries between 
the executer and the coordinator becomes.  
The HR scholars have acknowledged these vague demarcations of 
responsibilities as a huge hazard to the accountability of Frontex and 
Member States as well as to the right to an effective remedy as stipulated in 
Art 47 ChFR. As the operational nature of Frontex is reinforced, the semi-
managerial and semi-executive activities of Frontex not subject to sufficient 
scrutiny and legal accountability increases. The crucial point is the 
admissibility criteria requiring legal effect vis-à-vis a natural or legal person 
for having the right to institute a proceeding against Frontex before the 
ECJ.288  
The two directions envisaged by scholars is the extended possibilities for an 
individual to bring a claim against Frontex before ECJ and that the Union 
institutions step forward and function as fundamental rights litigators and 
put pressure on Frontex, who in turn monitor and compel the Member States 
to comply with fundamental rights and international protection standards. 
The incentive for the Member states would be the necessary financial and 
organisational help from the Union, available through Frontex.   
Unfortunately, I cannot envisage a comprehensive solution, such as a new 
agencies tribunal within ECJ with individual right to institute proceedings, 
to the accountability gap but rather a pragmatic cautious and gradual 
improvement and evolution of several different aspects regarding 
accountability. The rational for this cautious development is the struggle 
within the Union itself in particular within a sensitive area with traditional 
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national prerogatives, such as borders and migration.   
Regarding the further development of Frontex I agree with the scholarly 
view that it would be preferable with a careful development of the 
operational aspects of Frontex. Instead of only focusing on the operational 
capabilities and trying to make the agency independent through 
strengthened operational competences, the Commission and the Council 
should acknowledge other valuable aspects of Frontex’s role in the IBM. Of 
particular interest is the monitoring and evaluating mandate as well as the 
mandate regarding border guard training and a common core curriculum. As 
part of this, the provision regarding the obligation to terminate or suspend a 
JO could be elaborated and reinforced.  
I hold big expectations on the Parliament in hope of a stronger position for 
the Parliament and a better accountability for Frontex activities. The 
Parliament should step forward and exploit its role as a privileged applicant 
before the ECJ in relation to bringing claims against Frontex based on Art 
263 TFEU when its practices are alleged to breach fundamental rights. This 
could imply a new reinforced role for the Parliament in regard to AFSJ 
agencies and a new role for the ECJ as a fundamental rights tribunal. The 
proceedings would put pressure on the management by Frontex and could 
use the improved monitor and evaluation mandate of the agency as a basis 
for establishing liability. The problem of transparency should also be 
addressed in the next development of Frontex, in particular regarding the 
EP, a precondition for the Parliament as a litigator. 
As a complement, the ECJ could and should continue its tradition of 
dynamic interpretations of its jurisdiction in case law and apply a more 
flexible approach in regard to the admissibility criteria for individuals when 
initiating an annulment proceeding before the ECJ. The requirement of legal 
effect of the Frontex action vis-à-vis the applicant should be loosened up to 
attain a, in practice achievable, scrutiny of the activities of a Union agency 
which clearly have impact on the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individuals. It must be considered a continuation of the situation in which 
the ECJ argued, ‘it cannot be acceptable, in a community based on the rule 
of law, that such acts escape judicial review’.289 Making the ChFR legally 
binding was one step and other steps are envisaged, as the ECJ are to find its 
new role in a post-Lisbon context, of which this development could be one.  
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4 Analysis  
4.1 One Agency –three Perspectives 
The context of this contribution is the phenomenon of shared competences 
between EU and the Member States as the constitutional order of the policy 
field of European management of the external borders. The European Union 
was founded as a market union but currently references are often made to 
human rights, rule of law and democracy as founding values of the Union; 
evidential of the use of these concepts as legitimizing factors for promoting 
the Europeanization and the development towards a more rights-centred 
Union. However, one should keep in mind which values or objectives that 
actually founded the Union: that is economy. The core objectives in the 
beginning were a single market free of internal custom as a way of 
integrating Europe. The development of EU is not linear, from economy to 
human rights, but multi-layered and so is the integration debate. There are 
sub-contexts within the multi-layered integration debate creating a more 
complex setting. My three perspectives represent three of these sub-
contexts: integration, democracy and human rights. The first, labelled 
integration can be contested as a sub-context but focuses on the pursue of an 
integrated border management in order to achieve administrative efficiency 
in European border management and a uniform implementation and 
application of Union policies as well as it considers the Member States and 
their transferral of competences as conditions for integration.  
In this thesis I argue that the struggle of power and control over Frontex 
between EU institutions and Member States affects all policy 
recommendations with aims as improving fundamental rights sensitivity, 
transparency, efficiency, democratic and legal accountability. The effect of 
the unsettled power and control issue is a logjam in policy and law-making 
resulting in a legal framework with several huge shortcomings in essential 
aspects of Union values. 
Additionally, I argue that these can be visualized through my categorization 
of scholarship into three perspectives. These perspectives demonstrate that 
policy recommendations on different levels of detail all have the tensions 
from the struggle inherent. The tension is between an intergovernmental 
approach and a supranational approach to external border management and 
in particular to Frontex, but also between the EU institutions.  
The scholarly review can be differentiated in three perspectives to 
demonstrate three different natures and rationales within the Frontex debate. 
The perspectives is constructed, scholars cannot be strictly divided into the 
different perspectives neither are the perspectives by no means single 
regimes in the sense that they are completely demarcated from each other. 
Rather the opposite since I have presented and analysed views from the 
same author within two or all three of the perspectives. 
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The integration perspective demonstrates a call for a more supranational 
agency in order to achieve an efficient and uniform border management, as 
well as the acceptance of the conditions in the integration process, in 
particular in the AFSJ. This entails accepting that the control and power 
over Frontex is mostly placed in the hands of the Member States. It also 
accommodates the ambiguous relation between the member States and the 
development of Frontex, the calls for more operational competence and the 
fear of a comprehensive common border guard solution. The condition of 
the integration perspective is the everlasting balancing between the calls for 
a truly integrated border management and Member States’ reluctance to 
transfer power necessary for such solution. The result is an agency which 
does not fully exploit its efficiency and could contribute with consistency to 
a larger degree if some intergovernmental features were watered down. 
Then, Frontex could be truly fostered as a professional Union body.       
The democratic perspective entails a call for democratic scrutiny as a 
necessary and legitimizing element of a European Union promoting and 
exporting a constitutional order built on democracy and rule of law. The 
lack of parliamentary scrutiny of Frontex’s activities, especially the tasks 
possibly affecting the rights and freedoms of others, creates a vacuum in the 
accountability of the agency. However, increased involvement of the 
Parliament in Frontex activities would seriously impede on the Member 
States’ influence over Frontex and corresponding discretion.  
The human rights perspective generally foster a more independent agency 
with own fundamental and human rights responsibilities scrutinized by ECJ 
and challengeable by individuals, this entails a significant shift in control 
over the agency. The introduction of external accountability and scrutiny 
over Frontex activities would empower the ECJ and hence the Union as well 
as minimize the applicable discretion of Member States’ influence on 
Frontex.  
The human rights policy recommendations affect the Union’s competence 
not only in regard to Frontex but also in regard to operational activities of 
Member States within Union policy areas in general. These activities can be 
understood as connected to the execution of border management tasks by 
national competent authorities, which would concern the interpretation of 
Union competence in regard to Art 4.2 TEU and affect the institutional 
autonomy of Member States. 
4.2 Contradiction in Objectives  
When I first envisaged this thesis I wanted to disentangle perspectives 
inherent in the objective of an IBM and in particular in the development of 
Frontex. I perceived the perspectives to exist in tension and contradiction 
with each other whereas a presentation of the perspectives also would 
demonstrate the intrinsic tensions within policymaking and increase the 
understanding of Frontex and its development. However, the perspectives 
were not as contradictory as anticipated and not as easy to disentangle, they 
were instead intertwined and functioned simultaneously as cause and effect. 
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The democracy perspective and human rights perspective is admittedly 
focusing on different objectives as their highest priority. Still, they have 
many common objectives and those differing are not contrary but are 
instead mutually supportive and only hampered by the political and 
institutional settings in the shared competences between Member States and 
the Union. Both necessitate transparency, monitoring mechanisms and 
accountability before the Parliament respectively the ECJ. Both human and 
fundamental rights as well as democracy function as legitimizing the whole 
integration process. Fundamental rights form an area with legitimizing 
effect for the Europeanization processes, especially within the sensitive field 
of freedom, security and justice. Evidently, fundamental rights have 
certainly become a fundamental value for the Union; they are often referred 
to as the founding values of the Union.290 It is noteworthy that the founding 
Frontex Regulation did not pay any significant attention to fundamental or 
human rights, which inter alia can be explained by the exclusion of the 
Parliament, the guardian of fundamental rights, in the legislative process. A 
fact that have created massive attention from scholars and NGOs and 
definitely hampered the trust towards Frontex from society. In continuation, 
the increased fundamental rights focus could be explained by the 
corresponding increased role of the Parliament.  
In contrast, the integration perspective has the administrative efficiency of 
European border management and uniform implementation of Union 
policies as an objective for the IBM. Moreover, it has to consider the 
sensitive character of the field and constantly balance between 
intergovernmental features to gain trust from Member States as well as find 
a way forward without ending up in a logjam in the development of the 
border management and Frontex. In this perspective the intergovernmental 
features have been crucial for attaining some integration, but unfortunately 
unfitted together with the choice of an agency and the experimental 
character of Frontex governance.   
The reluctance of engaging in traditional law and policymaking stem from 
the fact that these negotiations trigger the Member States concern for their 
national prerogatives, the solution within almost the entire AFSJ has been a 
focus on operational cooperation. The choice of an agency implies 
independence, bureaucracy, that is, independent experts handling technical 
depoliticized matters. However, the management of the external borders are 
far away from depoliticized, rather it is very sensitive in its political nature. 
The fact that Frontex is politicized is hence a rather natural corollary to this. 
The fact that this Union body was established in form of an agency is thus 
the inconsistent momentum. This has been acknowledged as a political 
attempt to try and depoliticize an area. Why was this done? The favourable 
vacuum of democratic and legal scrutiny creates a large amount of 
discretionary power of the Member States and provide, at the same time, 
some of the advantages with a Union body, that is financial means and a 
highly developed infrastructure for management.   
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Yet, one could hardly anticipate a completely supranational delegation to a 
Union body, agency or not, since the competence of management of 
operational cooperation cannot be attributed to the Commission and not 
from single Member States either. I would argue that only the collective 
transferral from all Member States could accommodate this competence, 
since a single Member State cannot be said to have the competence of 
management of operational cooperation at the external borders of Member 
States. The setting of Frontex as a hybrid agency, make sense in the 
prolongation of this logic but also reveals the lack of traditional integration 
in this area.   
The experimental character of Frontex governance is due to the fact that 
how to achieve an IBM is still debatable and the lack of detailed and clear 
regulations, impossible to achieve within an area subject to political 
deadlocks as described in this contribution. The deadlocks in the area are 
not remarkable since it was not long ago a purely national issue and is now 
rephrased into a Union issue. 
These two features, the intergovernmental and politicized governance in the 
form of an independent agency and the experimental governance exacerbate 
the lack of democratic and legal scrutiny since it creates a possible arena for 
decisions and measures of both political and technical nature to escape both 
political and legal scrutiny. It is in this context the integration perspective 
opposes the perspectives of human rights and democracy. Their calls for 
scrutiny, monitoring, accountability and transparency challenge the sensitive 
character of Frontex as a Union body in the hands of Member States. This is 
the core of the tension in the policy recommendations and development of 
Frontex.  
4.3 Future Tensions and Compromises  
The Europeanization and transformation of AFSJ has resulted in a new 
institutional setting in the EU. On the one hand, the Commission has 
behaved like the main ‘motor’ of the European integration process and on 
the other hand, the Parliament has become an increasingly involved and 
authoritative player in EU cooperation in these areas, especially the first 
pillar areas like parts of external border management.291 This development 
can also be seen in regard to Frontex, the Commission plays a vital role in 
the promotion of a more integrated Frontex and the role of the EP was 
reinforced in the latest amendments. The evolution is welcomed taken in 
regard to the envisaged need for a plurality of views within the AFSJ and in 
particular in an agency like Frontex.292 Notwithstanding this development, it 
is difficult to detect the result of this envisaged plurality. It is only since the 
latest amendments in 2011 the involvement of the Parliament actually can 
be seen in regard to emphasis on fundamental rights. And with regard to the 
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intergovernmental features of Frontex the Commission’s call for a more 
supranational agency have been neglected, even though the 2011 
amendments increased the operational independence of Frontex vis-à-vis 
Member States. To summarize, the plurality of views in regard to Frontex, 
as a former first pillar agency, has not been as impressive as one prima facie 
could envisage.  
However, in many ways, the degree of integration in the area of border 
management is remarkable and innovative. The struggle between 
intergovernmental features and centralizing objectives within the border 
policy area denotes the main reason for the diverged role and vague 
contours of Frontex today. To create separate ‘executive’ bodies (agencies) 
seems to be the ‘hard case’ of institution-building when legislative 
harmonization is impassable, since it enables real action capacity at the EU 
level and strengthens the uniform application of Union policies.293 Such 
institution-building is thus about increasing the supranational input into the 
European policy process at an initial stage and finding a way forward for 
integration even in areas without consensus.294 Considering this, I claim that 
it is questionable whether Member States are fully aware of the degree of 
integration possible through Frontex with regard to the reluctance they hold 
against more comprehensive integration solutions.    
The two amendments of the initial Frontex Regulation have had a huge 
impact on the agency, the amendments are not changing details but each 
time shaping a new agency with new competences and giving de facto 
competences a legal basis. The RABIT Regulation resolved the perceived 
problem with a limited competence with regard to human resources in the 
context of the Member States’ need for additional border guards in 
exceptional situations. That was an apparent strengthening of the agency 
exactly like the second amendment was, with an accompanying emphasis on 
fundamental rights as a balancing factor.  
The focus on the operational capabilities has indeed strengthened the 
independence of Frontex, a necessary step according to me. However, it is 
not favourable in terms of integration to keep focusing on reinforcing the 
agency in this regard if it does not entail a more all-encompassing view of 
integration. This view should foster a balanced agency in terms of 
fundamental rights, a reinforced focus on regulatory tasks as evaluation and 
training and democratic and legal scrutiny.  
The calls for more focus on Frontex as a regulatory agency might be heeded 
in the future but this will not be done until the struggle for Frontex is settled, 
or rather until the Member States completely allow the Union to exercise its 
competence and provide supranational solutions for Frontex within the field 
of shared competences regarding management of the external borders. This 
would be in line with the subsidiarity principle since it has proven 
impossible to create a balanced, professional, efficient, legally and 
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democratically accountable agency for coordination of operational 
cooperation in a more intergovernmental setting. It is needed a 
comprehensive supranational approach to achieve a truly integrated border 
management of the external border of the European Union.  
Frontex is likely to slowly and gradually move towards a regulatory agency 
along with a progressive centralizing motion of the policy field, a panacea 
for the addressed shortcomings is not anticipated nor envisaged. 
For every year of operational cooperation the Member States and Frontex 
gain mutual trust and the EU institutions are also more and more involved in 
the agency. If looking at AFSJ policy and law-making it demonstrates that 
legislative measures always follow the operational cooperation and perhaps 
is it equally true that a comprehensive legal framework follows years of 
experience. This would imply a positive view of the possibilities for a sound 
legal framework for Frontex in the future. However, while the development 
of an all-encompassing legal framework for border management and in 
particular for Frontex follow the struggle of powers and the transfer of 
competences from member States to the Union, I still envisage a rather slow 
centralizing motion. Until then we have to be satisfied with a pragmatic 
development and a scattered legal situation for Frontex.  
4.4 Final Remarks 
To conclude, the struggle for regulatory power and management control 
over Frontex pervades all lex ferenda proposals and create a deadlock in 
regard to a comprehensive legal framework for Frontex. The deadlock can 
therefor not be remedied with a superior proposal or negotiation about 
technical legislative matters. It is a matter of competence transferral that 
ought to materialize. There is no other solution to the acute shortcomings in 
the Frontex Regulation, such as the lack of democratic involvement and 
scrutiny as well as legal accountability for human rights impact. 
This thesis did not pursue a lex ferenda proposal but provided a general 
overview of the policy field and the legal and institutional settings for the 
debate concerned with the evolvement of Frontex and the objective of a 
truly integrated management of the external border. It is part of a developing 
area of law since the legal framework and institutional settings have 
changed continuously in recent years. 
For further scholarly review, I consider it still relevant to examine, in depth, 
the objective of a European common corps of border guards considering the 
practical implementation of the amendments in 2011 and the current reality 
of the European integration. My study could then contribute as a backdrop 
to a more narrow and thorough practical integration analysis. 
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